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Case No. 20110015-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

Julio I. Martinez,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals his convictions for: aggravated assault causing serious
bodily injury; robbery; two counts of domestic violence in the presence of a child;
and interference with an arresting officer. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Did the trial court properly deny Defendant's motions for substitution of
appointed counsel, after the court inquired into the complaints and friction between
Defendant and his attorneys, and found that no actual conflict of interest existed?
Standard of Review. As applied here, to establish a violation of the Sixth
Amendment, Defendant must show that his trial attorneys labored under an actual
conflict of interest, that is, that their "loyalties [were] divided in a way that

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'adversely affect[ed their] performance/" State v. Maughan, 2008 UT 27, ^ 26,182
P.3d 903 (quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162,172 n.5 (2002)). Whether an actual
conflict exists is a mixed question of law and fact. See State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, \
22,984 P.2d 382, cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1083 (2000). Absent proof of an actual conflict,
a trial court's refusal to substitute counsel is reviewed only for abuse of discretion.
See State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377,381 (Utah App. 1997).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is at issue, but the wording of that
amendment is not determinative.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant does not directly challenge his convictions. Rather, he claims that
his convictions should be vacated and a new trial ordered because his trial attorneys
labored under an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected their
performance. See Br.Aplt. at 29-37. Defendant's crimes, therefore, are not at issue.
The State nevertheless briefly summarizes the facts as relevant to Defendant's
claims. Following this summary, the trial court's inquiries into and denials of
Defendant's pretrial and midtrial motions for substitution of counsel are discussed
in the Statement of the Case.
Throughout the night of May 4,2009, and continuing until the early morning
of May 5, 2009, Defendant was agitated, intoxicated, and bent on punishing those
2
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who had wronged him.1 Someone had previously murdered his brother and
Defendant wanted to "punish[ ]" the killer, R344:174-177. In addition, when the
brother was alive, Defendant's then-wife Teresa had slept with the brother.
Defendant felt she needed to "pay" for this transgression. R344:184-185. Despite
now being divorced, Defendant went to Teresa's apartment that night to sleep,
rather than driving home. Initially, she did not mind. R344:174-175.
Teresa lived in an apartment with their two children, nine-year-old Gabriel
and three-year-old Isaiah. R344:173-174. Teresa told Defendant to sleep on the
couch and then went upstairs to sleep with her children. R344:175. A few minutes
later, Defendant came upstairs. R344:176. He began ruminating about punishing
his brother's killer. Teresa told him to be quiet and the two went downstairs. Id.
Still agitated, Defendant asked Teresa, "Do you want to see how down I am?"
and grabbed a kitchen knife and stabbed himself in his arm. R344:177. He calmed
down a bit and left to get cigarettes. R344:146,178-179.

Consistent with appellate standards, the facts are stated in the light most
favorable to the trial court rulings and jury verdicts. See State v. Allen, 2005 UT11,
^ 2,108 P.3d 730, cert denied, 546 U.S. 832 (2005).
3
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Defendant went to a nearby 7-11 convenience store. R343:90. Jose Jimenez
was the clerk on duty. R343:85,90. Defendant got a pack of cigarettes and a pair of
scissors and then left,2 R344:90-91; Exhibit 7 (scissors).
Around 2 a.m., Defendant returned to Teresa's apartment. R344:180. He was
still intoxicated and asked Teresa to have sex with him, but she refused. R344:184.
Defendant then said she needed to "pay" for sleeping with his brother. R344:184185. He pulled out the scissors, and Teresa asked him what he was going to do.
R344:185. He replied, "I'm going to kill you/7 Id. Defendant then began stabbing
Teresa with the scissors over and over again, all the while telling her that she
needed to "pay" and that "this was what [she] got." R344:185-186. Teresa
screamed for him to stop. R344:188. Thinking she "was going to die," she curled
into a fetal position to protect herself, but the scissors' blades punctured her leg, her
armpit, and her arm. R344:186-188. When Defendant still did not stop, Teresa
rolled onto the carpet and played dead. R344:188.
The noise woke up the children. Isaiah stayed upstairs, but Gabriel walked
down the stairs. Gabriel heard his father scream at his mother, "I will kill you. This

2

Defendant was originally charged with stealing the scissors, but that charge
was dropped before trial. Rl-5,243-46. Defense counsel then successfully argued
that evidence of the prior bad act should be excluded from trial. R343:6-14.
Consequently, Jimenez testified only that Defendant "got" the scissors from the
store. R343:91-92.
4
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is what happen[s] to you for fucking my brother." Gabriel also saw his father
"stabbing my mom." R344:50,105,149.
Finally, Defendant stopped and left. R343:61; R344:189. Teresa managed to
get up, lock the front door, and call 911-emergency. R344:189-190. She screamed
into the phone: "Hurry, I've been stabbed. I've been stabbed. I've been stabbed.
I've been stabbed

Oh, I've been stabbed like 20 times." Exhibit 1 (911 call). Faint

and numb, Teresa slumped to the ground and handed Gabriel the phone, R344:191.
Gabriel begged the 911-operator for help: "Could you come over please, my mom
just got stabbed . . . he's my dad . . . he just left
much blood on the ground and she's been stabbed

She's bleeding so bad, there's so
On the arm and the legs....

Please hurry . . . she's going to faint. . . she is getting really tired." Exh.l. Just
before Teresa lost consciousness, she heard Gabriel ask, "Mommy, are you going to
die?" R343:191-192.
The police found Gabriel "frozen . . . in shock, [and] unable to speak."
R343:43. Teresa appeared to be "near death," lying in a pool of blood behind the
front door. R343:45,47-49,60. Another pool of blood was on the living room carpet,
where Teresa had played dead. R343:45. Blood was on a window behind the couch
and the bloody scissors were on the couch. R343:60-61.
After Defendant left, he removed his shirt and drove to the same convenience
store he had gone to earlier. R343:94. Jimenez was still on duty. Id. Jimenez saw
5
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that Defendant was "mad" and that his hands were bloody. R343:96. Defendant
demanded that Jimenez turn on the gas pump so that Defendant could put gas in
his truck. R343:94. Jimenez falsely told him the pump was broken. Defendant
walked outside, but then came back into the store and warned Jimenez that if he did
not turn on the pump, he "was going to lose [his] life." R343:95-96.
Defendant walked back outside, towards his truck at the pump. R344:60. The
police — who had been looking for Defendant's truck — saw him and ordered him to
stop walking. R344:60,62. He ignored them. R344:63. The officers repeated the
command five to six times. Id. Defendant began walking aggressively towards an
officer, clenching his fist, pointing at his head or neck, and not making a lot of sense.
R344:64-65,77~78,90. The officer saw blood on Defendant's hands, wrists, and
forearms and felt "threatened." R344:65-66. Another officer "tasered" Defendant,
who then fell to the ground and was arrested. R344:91-92.
Teresa was rushed to the hospital. She believed that Defendant stabbed at her
15-20 times; seven to eight of the stabs produced physical injury. R344:48,188;
Exhs.1,9-14,24-25. Teresa had two punctures on her left leg, one that was six
centimeters long and another that was four centimeters. R344:41; Exhs.13-14. She
had four or five lacerations on her arm, including a one-centimeter laceration in her
armpit. R344:33-34,41,48; Exhs.24-25. And she had a small 0.5-centimeter laceration
at her hairline on the side of her forehead. R344:41,45; Exhibits 9-12. Her leg and
6
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arm required surgery; and a year later, she still did not have complete function in
her hand due to her arm injuries. R344:198-199.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2009, Defendant was charged with Teresa's attempted murder, a firstdegree felony, and with two counts of domestic violence in the presence of Gabriel
and Isaiah, third-degree felonies. Rl-9,243-246. In the same information, Defendant
was also charged with the robbery of the convenience store clerk, a second-degree
felony, and with class B misdemeanor interference with an arresting officer. Id. Salt
Lake Legal Defender Association [LDA] attorneys, Patrick Tan and Charity Shreve,
were appointed to represent him. R12-13,20,31.
A. Before trial, Defendant moved for substitution of counsel.
In the months before trial, Tan and Shreve requested discovery; requested a
bail hearing; requested Defendant's release from jail for a funeral; represented
Defendant at the preliminary hearing; represented Defendant at arraignment;
requested supplemental discovery, including the rap sheets of all state witnesses;
attended a scheduling conference; moved for discovery of Teresa's Division of
Family Service [DCFS] records; provided notice of self-defense as required by
statute; moved to continue the trial to facilitate additional defense investigation; and
subpoenaed Teresa's DCFS records. R21-26,34,65-66,75-78,82-89,101-103,107.

7
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Nevertheless, some two months before trial, Defendant filed a pro se motion
requesting that new counsel be appointed. R133-135. Defendant complained that
his current attorneys were not communicating with him and had failed to obtain
necessary "medical" records, meaning the DCFS records. Id. See Add. A.
B. The trial court inquired into the complaints and denied the motion.
The trial court held a hearing on the pro se motion and directly questioned
Defendant about his complaints. R360:3-23. See Add. B.
Defendant first complained that his attorneys were not moving to suppress
his father's statement to the police that Defendant had threatened him the same
night Defendant assaulted Teresa. R360:9. Defense counsel responded that they
had reviewed the father's statement, but had found no good faith basis to support a
motion to suppress. Moreover, the prosecutor did not plan to introduce the
statement at trial. R360:10-12. The trial court independently reviewed the father's
statement, agreed there was no basis to suppress it, and found that Defendant's
disagreement with counsels' legitimate strategic decision did not establish good
cause to substitute counsel. R360:15-18.
Defendant

next claimed that his attorneys were not adequately

communicating with him and opined that they would not be ready for trial in two
months, because they did not have Teresa's DCFS records. R360:9-10,18-19.
Defense counsel explained that they maintained a log of their jail visits and that they
8
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were visiting Defendant more than most of their jailed clients — at least three weeks
out of four, for at least 15 minutes to an hour per visit. R360:13-14. Counsel also
explained their efforts to secure Teresa's DCFS records and that the matter was still
being litigated. R360:14-15,20. When counsel stated that they had explained this to
Defendant, Defendant admitted that they had, but claimed that it was only because
he had asked. R360:15,18-19. The court found that Defendant's claim of inadequate
communication was unfounded and/or resolved.3 R360:19.
The court asked Defendant and his attorneys if they had any other concerns
or complaints. They all said no. R360:21-23. The court told Defendant that if he had
complaints in the future, he should "voice" them, but again stated that there was
"no basis so far on any grounds" to substitute counsel. R360:22.
C

Midtrial, the defense attorneys disclosed that they felt intimidated.
A three-day jury trial began on August 2, 2010. R249-252,293-294. Before

testimony began, the court overruled a defense objection to a jury instruction;
denied a defense motion to sever the robbery charge from the other charges; and
denied a defense motion to exclude a police officer's statement that Teresa was
"delta" — meaning "one step short of being dead" — when he found her. R343:4-6,ll12,18. The court granted a defense motion to exclude bad acts evidence involving

Counsel later successfully secured the DCFS records, but the records did not
support a self-defense claim, as hoped. R185,191-194,197-211; R343:14-15; R344:241.
9
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Defendant's alleged theft of the scissors he used to attack Teresa, his flashing of
gang signs, and his gang-related tattoos. R343:7,l0,12-14. The court also granted a
defense motion restricting any reference to Teresa as a "victim." R343:22. And at
defense counsel's request, introduction of a jail telephone call from Defendant to
Teresa was delayed until the defense had an opportunity to review it. R344:20-21.
Both sides made opening statements. R343:31-37. The prosecution began its
case by playing Teresa's 911-emergency call for help and by questioning the officer
who first arrived at the scene. Defense counsel objected to some evidence and crossexamined the officer. R343:40,41-44,47-49,63-65,67-79. See also Exh.l (911 call).
The next prosecution witness was the convenience store clerk, Jose Jimenez.
Jimenez testified that on the night in question, Defendant "got" scissors from the
convenience store and then left, but later returned with blood on his hands and
threaten to kill Jimenez if he did not give Defendant gas. R343:84-102.
After the direct examination and outside the presence of the jury, defense
counsel informed the court that Defendant wanted to know if a plea offer was still
"on the table." R343:104. An offer was still available: Defendant could plead guilty
to the two domestic violence charges and a reduced "three-to-five" offense in lieu of
the attempted murder charge, and the State would dismiss the remaining charges.
R343:105-106. After discussing the offer with his attorneys, Defendant rejected it.

10
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The Court directly questioned Defendant to confirm that he wished to proceed with
trial. Id.
Trial continued and defense counsel Shreve cross-examined Jimenez.
R343:106-113. See Add. C. Jimenez testified that he had seen Defendant in the store
on other occasions, but did not know his name and had not conversed with him
before that night. R343:90,107. The defense theory, however, was that Jimenez
knew Defendant more than he admitted, had given him store items for free, and was
now falsely accusing Defendant of robbery to cover up his own misconduct.
R343:109-lll; R345:26-27. In furtherance of this theory, Shreve elicited that Jimenez
was on felony probation and faced possible violation if he lost his job. R343:108-lll.
As Shreve questioned Jimenez, Defendant passed her a note with additional
questions he wanted her to ask. R344:16. Shreve then asked Jimenez if he had
testified at the preliminary hearing that he and Defendant had engaged in "dozens"
of conversations before that night. R343:112.
The prosecutor objected that Shreve was misstating Jimenez's prior testimony.
Id. But when Shreve attempted to withdraw the question, the court refused and
directed her to read aloud the relevant portion of Jimenez's preliminary hearing
testimony. The portion Shreve read revealed that Jimenez had previously testified
only that he saw or waited on Defendant on other occasions. R343:112-113. The

11
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judge told Shreve: "You are admonished that that is an incorrect impeachment."
R343:113.
Shreve then asked Jimenez one more question and concluded her
examination. The jury was excused for the night. Id.
After the jury left, the judge scolded Shreve again: "You know better than
that, right?" Shreve responded, "Right." R343:114. Defendant then began arguing
with the judge. He insisted that Jimenez had previously testified differently,
asserting that "[i]t says it right here on the preliminary transcripts," and read the
section out loud. R343:114-115. The judge told Defendant that his attorneys could
explain why his interpretation of Jimenez's testimony was wrong. R343:115.
Defendant replied: "Well, I think I'm going to file an ineffective counsel on me then
because you're not representing—you are not going right through the —." R343:115.
The judge asked both defense attorneys if, in fact, Jimenez had previously testified
to having dozens of conversations with Defendant and both said no. R343:115-116.
Defendant blurted out: "Well, it's right there in the transcript." R343:116. The court
recessed for the night. Id. See Add. C.
That evening, Tan and Shreve contacted Judge Hilder, the district court
presiding judge, to discuss "an issue of concern arising from [the] ongoing trial."
R344:135. See Add. D.

12
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The defense attorneys explained that they were "having some challenges with
their client/' which included "a sense of intimidation" they felt and a "staring down
episode" with him, but they "did not discuss what was behind that." Id. They
"couldn't really articulate what it was, but that there was a sense of being
compromised in the ability to exercise a judgment they normally exercise or to make
a decision they would normally make." R344:136. Shreve asserted that this had
caused her to do "something... that d a y . . . that was against an old judge that she
normally would not have done." 4 Id.
Judge Hilder later telephoned the trial judge to explain that the defense
attorneys had contacted him. R344:136. See Add. D. Judge Hilder opined that for
some defendants, an attorney's "gender" was an issue and that this might be the
situation here. Id. The trial judge understood from the conversation— and from
subsequent discussions with defense counsel — that the intimidation the attorneys
felt was not causing them to forego 'Valid and helpful" arguments, but had driven
them to do things — such as the improper impeachment of Jimenez — that they might
not otherwise have done. R344:136-137.

Judge Hilder's conversation with counsel and his subsequent conversation
with the trial judge were not contemporaneously recorded. However, defense
counsel later moved to recuse the trial judge —fearing that he might have been
tainted by his conversation with Judge Hilder — and both judges then recreated the
conversations for the record. See Add. D. Thereafter, defense counsel withdrew the
motion to recuse as groundless. R344:138-139.
13
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The next day —without the jury or Defendant present—the trial judge
disclosed to the prosecutor and Tan the gist of what Judge Hilder had said:
I think the gist of the communications was that. . . Mr. Tan and Ms.
Shreve feel extremely threatened by their client to the point that they
are worried about their ability to put on a defense and feel that they
have compromised perhaps by making some bad judgment calls,
perhaps last night was an example of one [referring to the
impeachment], because of the threats — I'm saying threats, but that may
not be right, but because of the perceived intimidation from their client,
and were in a quandary about what to do with it.... So I thought the
first and most appropriate thing to do, [addressing the prosecutors],
was to make sure that everybody is obviously playing from a level
playing field and bring these communications to your attention. . . .
The second is to decide where you [addressing defense counsel] go
from here. I don't know if you've had any requests whatsoever that
was after having slept on it, perhaps frustration at the admonishment
that Ms. Shreve received at the end of the day.
R344:5-7. See Add. E. Tan represented that the attorneys' concern was not so much
with the admonishment, but with "our ability to continue to adequately and
zealously represent [Defendant] in trial." R344:7. The court then clarified that Tan
was not suggesting that the attorneys had or would neglect legitimate defenses:
It's your duty adequately and zealously to represent him. And it
sounds to me, you correct me if I am wrong, it's not that you are
forgoing legitimate cross-examination, you are not foregoing the — and
I don't want you to answer this in any way that would invade the
integrity of the attorney/client privilege or work product, that it's not
that you are foregoing the good stuff, it's that perhaps his intimidation
has led you to do things that would otherwise be against your
professional judgment.
R344:7. Tan responded: "That's accurate, your Honor." Id. See Add. E.
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Tan voiced concern that Shreve had not yet shown up in court. R344:7-8. The
prosecutor opined that if actual threats were involved, the prosecutor had a duty to
investigate. R344:8-9. The judge replied that only intimation was at issue and
directed Tan to reject any future improper client demands:
My sense right now . . . it's more of... intimidation, but that's not the
point. And if that's the case, Mr. Tan, my initial reaction is, forgive me
saying this a little bit, but it's —you've got a duty to your client and
you're also an officer of the Court. And at some point you just call,
excuse my french, bullshit, and you don't do things like last night.
Right?
R344:9. Tan agreed. Id.
Shreve then appeared. The judge explained what was wrong with the
attempted impeachment and the unfair impression that would have been left for the
jury if Shreve had been allowed to withdraw the impeachment question. R344:943.
Shreve agreed, and the judge expressed respect for her. R344:13.
Tan opined that three issues were involved. First, the defense attorneys
needed to "continue to zealously represent our defendant. And because of that I
can't disclose certain information." R344:13. The court interjected that Defendant
must be informed that his attorneys felt intimidated, regardless of whether that
"may be or may not be a breach." Id. Second, Tan acknowledged that the attorneys
as officers of the court had certain ethical obligations to the court. Id. Third, Tan
expressed concern for "the wellbeing of my client" and presumptively Shreve. Cf.
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id. Shreve replied that the prosecutor had agreed to provide more security and that
she was fine and ready to continue trial.5 R344:ll-13,137.
D. Defendant again moved for substitution of counsel and after inquiry,
the court denied the midtrial motion.
In open court—but without the jury present — the court informed Defendant
of what had been discussed in chambers. R344:14. See Add. E.
First, the court explained why it had admonished Shreve the day before and
reminded Defendant that his own reaction to the court's ruling was inappropriate.
R344:14-15. The judge further explained that over the night recess, he had reread
the preliminary hearing transcript and listened to the hearing tape to confirm the
correctness of the impeachment ruling. Id.
The court then told Defendant that his attorneys— "rightfully or
wrongfully" — felt intimated by him, which "perhaps caused them to do things that
they would not otherwise do as officers of the Court/' for example, the improper
impeachment. R344:15-16. Defendant initially agreed and opined that Shreve may
have misunderstood the questions he wanted asked. R344:16.
But Defendant then began arguing, insisting that Jimenez had previously
testified differently than his trial testimony. Id. The court explained that if
5

Two deputies were placed in the courtroom. R344:169. Shreve had also
reported to the police — but not to the court at the time — that she had been followed
home the night before. R361:3-5. She did not know if that incident was related to
the trial. Id. The trial court learned of the incident after the trial. See Add. H.
16
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Defendant wished, he raise an ineffectiveness claim on appeal.

R344:16-17.

Defendant responded: "Well, Fm already going to fill out a motion to—file for new
counsel based on integrity of counsel (inaudible)/7 R344:17. The court explained
that because they were in the middle of trial, it could not simply appoint new
counsel. But if Defendant were convicted, the court explained, new counsel could
be appointed for appeal, who could then challenge the effectiveness of trial counsel.
R344:19. Tan agreed that LDA's policy was to appoint conflicts counsel when
necessary. Id.
Defendant claimed that an actual conflict existed:
My lawyers, they feel intimated by me, so, therefore, we have a conflict
of interest. So therefore, they feel they are afraid of me or whatever
their complaints would be. So, therefore, there's a conflict between me
and the lawyers. So, therefore, I don't see how we can, you know,
communicate without me feeling that there's a fear between me and
them.
R344:23. The court asked Tan and Shreve if they could still "vigorously represent"
Defendant, and both responded that they could. R344:23-24. Tan noted that legal
defenders often have intimidating clients, but still zealously advocate on their
behalf. R344:24. The court found that Tan and Shreve were "capable of fully
performing" despite any perceived intimidation. Id. The court also noted that the
intimidation the attorneys felt derived from Defendant's "own conduct" and
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warned that Defendant could not "recreate [sic] the situation in which you get new
counsel by doing that." Id. See Add. E.
Defendant then argued other reasons why new counsel was necessary. He
first claimed again that Tan and Shreve had failed to suppress his father's
statement—a statement not admitted at trial— but this claim had already been
considered and rejected.

R344:25; R360:15-18. He then complained that his

attorneys had not informed him that the severance motion was denied and insisted
that he was not present when the motion was argued and denied. R344:18-20,25-26.
The court told Defendant: "Stop pulling my leg[.] . . . [Y]ou were present when it
was argued." R344: 26-27. See also R343:6-14. Defendant admitted that he had
forgotten that he was and attempted to withdraw his motion for substitution: "IT1
agree to go forward with this counsel." The court responded, "I'm not giving you a
choice. Your motion is denied." Id.
When the court again tried to explain Defendant's right to appeal adverse
rulings, Defendant cut the judge off and accused him of "violating my constitutional
rights." R344:27. After Defendant then "stare[d] down" the judge, the judge told
him: "I've tried ... a couple of hundred jury cases, and I'm telling you that you are
being as difficult a defendant as any I have encountered[.]" R344:27-28.
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E. The trial continued without further incident or complaint.
The trial continued without further incident or complaint. The defense
actively continued to object to evidence and to cross-examine witnesses. R344:39,4351,64-66,71-72,76-81,90,93-97,104,106,108,113-139,148-153,195,204-205,209-221. They
successfully cross-examined Teresa under rule 608, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, about
an untruthful prior statement she made to the police in an unrelated matter.
R344:156-l61,208-209. They explored, albeit unsuccessfully, if Teresa harbored a
motive to falsely accuse Defendant. R344:162-163.
Tan and Shreve also twice moved for mistrial after the bailiff overheard two
jurors discussing why additional deputies were in the courtroom. One juror opined:
"It's so the Defendant can be detained." R344:164. The bailiff interjected, "[Ijt's
because we are doing training," and then reported the incident to the court. Id.
Defense counsel moved for mistrial, but to avoid calling more attention to the
matter, counsel opposed any questioning of the individual jurors or the giving of a
"hot patch" curative jury instruction. R344:165-170,227-228. The court denied the
mistrial motion and reaffirmed that denial when the motion was later renewed.6 Id.
The defense also moved for a directed verdict on the attempted murder charge,
which was denied. R344:224-227.

At defense counsel's request, the juror who made the comment was later
removed from the jury. R345:7-13.
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The defense recalled Defendant's son Gabriel as a witness to clarify a point,
R344:231-234, but called no other defense witnesses. Out of the presence of the jury,
the defense attorneys explained that they had explained Defendant's right to testify
to him and that he had chosen not to testify. The court questioned Defendant twice
to ensure that this was his choice and that he had had adequate time to consult with
counsel. R344:228-230,235-36. See Add. F. The defense then rested.
F.

Defense counsel successfully argued that Defendant lacked the
intent to kill.
In closing argument, defense counsel successfully argued that Defendant

lacked the intent to kill Teresa, despite Defendant's expressed intent to kill her as
punishment for sleeping with his brother. R345:20-40. See Add. G.
Counsel admitted that Teresa and Gabriel's eyewitness accounts established
that Defendant repeatedly stabbed Teresa. But counsel argued that the medical and
physical evidence supported that when Defendant stabbed Teresa, he did not intend
to kill her. R345:21-23,29-40.
Counsel further argued that Defendant was "so intoxicated, he probably
didn't know what he intended to do the next minute, maybe even the next second"
and encouraged the jury to consider this and the emotional upheaval Defendant felt
over the demise of his marriage. R345:24,31,38. Counsel argued that the attempted
murder charge amounted to overzealous charging and urged the jury to find
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Defendant not guilty of that offense and guilty instead of the lesser-included offense
of aggravated assault. R345:27-29. See also R272,275-277 (jury instructions).
Defense counsel admitted that because Defendant assaulted Teresa, he was
guilty of committing domestic violence in the presence of Gabriel and Isaiah —but
based only on assault and not attempted murder. R345:25-26,37-39.
Defense counsel also admitted that Defendant was guilty of interference with
an officer. R345:25. But counsel urged the jury to acquit Defendant of the robbery
charge, because Jimenez was not credible in that he was a convicted felon and had a
motive to lie. R345:26-27.
The jury acquitted Defendant of attempted murder and convicted him instead
of the lesser offense of aggravated assault. R263-264. The jury then convicted
Defendant of the remaining charges. Id.
G. Before sentencing, LDA withdrew.
Two weeks after trial, but before sentencing, LDA withdrew and a conflictscontract attorney was appointed. R303-305. Conflicts counsel moved to recuse the
trial judge from sentencing Defendant, but the motion was denied. R314-333.
On October 8, 2010, the trial court sentenced Defendant to two consecutive
terms of one-to-15 years imprisonment for aggravated assault and robbery, to run
consecutively to each other and consecutively to another sentence Defendant was
then serving.

R335-336.

The court imposed terms of zero-to-five years
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imprisonment on each domestic violence offense, to run concurrently with
Defendant's other sentences; and the court sentenced Defendant to time served on
the interference charge. Id. Conflicts counsel moved for a new trial, alleging that
both trial attorneys were ineffective, but upon further review, withdrew the motion.
Conflicts counsel then withdrew and conflicts appellate counsel was appointed.
R337-342,347. A notice of appeal was timely filed. R351-352.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims he is entitled to a new trial because: (1) his attorneys were
intimidated by him and, therefore, labored under an actual conflict of interest; (2)
the trial court failed to adequately inquire into this and other complaints Defendant
had with his attorneys; and (3) the court erred in denying Defendant's requests for
substitute counsel. This Court should not reach the merits of the claims, because
Defendant fails to properly marshal the facts surrounding the trial court's factual
inquiries and its fact-dependent rulings. Alternatively, no actual conflict existed
and, consequently, the trial court properly exercised its discretion and refused to
substitute counsel.
Defendant bears the burden of proving the existence of an actual conflict of
interest. He must show not only that his trial attorneys had divided loyalties, but
that the divided loyalties adversely affected their performance. Here, neither
requirement is met.
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First, the trial court fully inquired into Defendant's complaints with his
attorneys, as well as any friction that arose from Defendant's actual or perceived
intimidation of them.

The court found that—but for the intimidation—the

complaints were wholly without merit. As to the intimidation, the court correctly
ruled, Defendant could not intimidate his attorneys and then claim that he was
entitled to new counsel because his attorneys were intimidated. The court also
correctly ruled that regardless of who or what caused the intimidation, its existence
did not create an* actual conflict of interest here, because it did not cause either
defense attorney to forgo legitimate defenses or to otherwise act against Defendant's
interests. At most, it caused one of those attorneys to ask one inappropriate
impeachment question.
Second, contrary to Defendant's assertion, the defense closing argument does
not demonstrate the existence of an actual conflict. Faced with overwhelming
evidence of Defendant's guilt, his attorneys legitimately chose to concede what was
obvious and to attack only what they credibly could. The strategy worked, despite
Defendant's expressed intent to kill Teresa. The jury acquitted Defendant of
attempted murder and convicted him instead of aggravated assault. And although
the jury convicted Defendant of robbery, his attorneys actively argued that Jimenez,
the store clerk, was not credible. As to the other offenses — two domestic violence
charges and the interference charge —no legitimate defenses existed.
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In sum, Defendant was fully accorded his right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment and his convictions should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INQUIRED INTO ALL
COMPLAINTS AND FRICTION BETWEEN DEFNDANT AND HIS
ATTORNEYS AND CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT NO
ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST EXISTED
Defendant does not directly challenge his convictions. Rather, he claims that
those convictions should be vacated and a new trial ordered because: (1) his
attorneys felt intimidated by him and, therefore, an actual conflict of interest existed;
(2) the trial court failed to adequately inquire into this and other complaints
Defendant had with his attorneys; and, consequently, (3) the court erred in denying
his motions for substitution of counsel. See Br.Aplt. at 1 & 24-37. According to
Defendant, the " clearest indication of the breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship was counsel's closing argument/7 Id. at 32.
This Court should not read the merits of the claims, because Defendant fails to
properly marshal the underlying facts. Alternatively, if the merits are considered,
the trial court fairly inquired into the expressed complaints and friction and
correctly determined that no actual conflict of interest or other good cause for
substitution of counsel existed. The trial court then properly exercised its discretion
and denied Defendant's motions.
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A, The merits should not be considered, because Defendant fails to
marshal the underlying facts.
Defendant asserts two fact-dependent claims — first, that an actual conflict of
interest existed with his trial counsel, and second, that the court's inquiries into that
conflict were inadequate. See State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, f 22, 984 R2d 382
(recognizing that whether actual conflict exists is mixed question of law and fact),
cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1083 (2000); State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270,273 (Utah App. 1987)
(recognizing that scope of trial court's inquiry is dependent on facts asserted).
Because resolution of both issues is fact-dependent, Defendant must marshal
the underlying facts before he may challenge the validity of the trial court's ultimate
determinations. See UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) (imposing marshaling burden on
appellant). See also Kimball v. Kimball 2009 UT App 233, ^ 22, 217 P.3d 733 ("Even
where [a defendant] purports] to challenge only [a] legal ruling, . . . if a
determination of the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is
extremely fact-sensitive, [the defendant] also ha[s] a duty to marshal the evidence.")
(citation and internal marks omitted); United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting
Mayflower ML Ponds, 2006 UT 35, \ 38,140 P.3d 1200 ( "Parties seeking appellate
review must marshal the evidence on those questions that require substantive
factual inquiry, regardless of whether those questions are reviewed for clear error or
abuse of discretion.").

25
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Defendant recites numerous facts. See BrAplt at 3-23. But he fails to properly
marshal them. Proper marshaling requires him to amass "every scrap of competent
evidence" that support the adverse decision and then show why that evidence and
its reasonable inferences, "even when . . . view[ed] in a light most favorable to the
court b e l o w . . . are legally insufficient." United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35, ^
39 & 24; West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App.
1991). It requires him to embrace the very position he opposed below and not
"merely re-argue the factual case presented in the trial court." United Park City
Mines, 2006 UT 35, f 26 (citations and internal marks omitted). Because Defendant
fails to "perform this critical task," this Court should not reach the merits. See id. at
^j 27 (recognizing appellate court may summarily affirm for failure to marshal).
A comparison of Defendant's recitation of facts with the State's Statement of
the Case readily demonstrates his marshaling failures. Compare BrAplt. at 3-23, with
Statement of the Case, supra. Although not exhaustive, the following also exemplify
these failures.
Defendant asserts that the trial court denied his motions for substitution of
counsel in a perfunctory manner.

See BrAplt. at 1, 24, 35.

In support, he

summarizes the court's pretrial ruling in one sentence —"that [the court] saw
'absolutely no basis for replacing counsel in this case.'" Id. at 4 (citing R360:19). He
similarly summarizes the court's midtrial ruling as essentially: "I've been informed
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by your counsel that they feel intimidated . . . we're going to go forward with this
trial" and "'[y]our motion is denied/77 Id. at 11-12 (citing R360:15-16,27). When the
facts are properly marshaled, however, they establish that the court's findings and
rulings were much broader than this.7 Compare Br.Aplt. at 3-4, 9-13, with State's
Statement of the Case, supra, at 8-9,12-18; and Addenda B, E.
The facts, when properly marshaled, show that the court discussed in detail
each of Defendant's pretrial complaints before rejecting them. The court personally
reviewed the statement Defendant wanted suppressed before finding there was no
basis to suppress it and that, consequently, defense counsel had legitimately chosen
not to file the frivolous motion. R360:10-13,15-18. The court also found that the
attorneys were in fact communicating with Defendant on a regular basis before
ruling that Defendant's contrary allegation was unfounded. R360:13-15,18-19.
When Defendant re-raised the same complaint midtrial, the court did summarily
reject it. But by that point, the court already knew the complaint was unfounded
and had seen ongoing attorney-client communications during the trial. R344:1819,26-27.

See, e.g., R343:104-106 (attorney-client discussion of plea bargain);

Defendant lumps together the pretrial and midtrial motions. See Br.Aplt. at
1,23-24, & 29. He does not claim, however, that the trial court erred in denying the
pretrial motion, but only in denying the midtrial motion. See id. at 30-37.
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R343:114-116; R344:16 (defendant's directive note to counsel); R344:228-30 (attorneyclient discussion of right to testify).
Similarly, during its midtrial inquiry, the court initially stated that the defense
attorneys were "extremely threatened" by Defendant. See Br.Aplt. at 16 (citing
R344:6). But the court then corrected itself and clarified that no actual threats were
involved, only intimidation. R344:9. The court also found — based on the attorneys'
representations and its own observations — that the intimidation had not caused the
attorneys to forego legitimate defenses. R344:7-9,13,15-16,23-24. Rather, it had only
caused them to acquiesce to one improper demand: the improper impeachment of
Jimenez. R344:15-16. The court directed the attorneys to call "bullshit," if similar
demands arose in the future, and counsel agreed. R344:9.
Perhaps more significantly, Defendant acknowledges but does not properly
marshal his own statements and actions that support the trial court's rulings. See
Br.Aplt. at 4,8-9,11-12. For example, below, Defendant claimed his attorneys were
not communicating with him, but minutes later, admitted that they had. R360:15,18.
He insisted that they failed to tell him the severance motion was denied, but within
minutes, admitted that he had forgotten he was in the courtroom when it was
denied.

R344:25-27.

Similarly, after his attorneys disclosed the perceived

intimidation, Defendant did not deny it or claim that his attorneys could not
zealously represent him. R344:14-28. He claimed only that because he now knew
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his attorneys feared him, that fact might impact future attorney-client
communications. R344:23. But again, a few minutes later, he said he wanted to "go
forward with this counsel" and, in effect, withdrew the substitution request.
R344:27. The court, nevertheless, told Defendant that the choice was not his and
denied the motion. Id. In response, Defendant "starefd] down" the judge, which
was the same type of intimidation his attorneys claimed he did to them. R344:25,135.
Which incident prompted and supports the court's observation, that Defendant
could not intimidate his attorneys and then manipulatively claim that the
intimidation justified appointment of new counsel. R344:24.
In sum, Defendant's marshaling failures justify summary rejection of his
claims. Alternatively, if the merits of the claims are considered, no error occurred.
B. Alternatively, if the merits are considered, substitution of appointed
counsel is required only when an actual conflict of interest or
equivalent good cause exists.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal
defendant the right to the effective assistance of counsel.8 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S.
162,166 (2002). "This right has been accorded ... 'not for its own sake, but because
of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.,,/ Id. (quoting
8

Other than summarily citing to article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution,
see Br.Aplt. at 2, Defendant does not raise a separate state constitutional argument.
See State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285,291 n.4 (Utah App. 1998) (addressing only Sixth
Amendment claim, where no separate state constitutional analysis provided), cert,
denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999).
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United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)). Accord State v. Gruber, 2007 UT 50,111,
165 P.3d 1185. "It follows from this that assistance which is ineffective in preserving
fairness does not meet the constitutional mandate, see Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 685-686 (1984); and it also follows that defects in assistance that have no
probable effect upon the trial's outcome do not establish a constitutional violation/'
Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166. "As a general matter, a defendant alleging a Sixth
Amendment violation must demonstrate 'a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.'" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
An exception to this general rule exists, however, when a defendant asserts
that his counsel was ineffective due to a conflict of interest, as Defendant does here.
See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166. In such cases, the defendant must show that an "actual
conflict of interest" exists, that is, a conflict that "adversely affected his lawyer's
performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,348 (1980). Thus, not all conflicts rise
to the level of an actual conflict. Id. at 348 & 350 (holding that Sixth Amendment not
violated by possible or potential conflicts). Accord State v. Maughan, 2008 UT 27, f
26,182 P.3d 903. Rather, for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, an actual conflict
exists only if counsel had divided loyalties at the time of representation that, in fact,
compelled him "to make a choice advancing his own interests to the detriment of his
client's interests." See State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681,686 (Utah 1997). Accord Bredehoft,
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966 P.2d at 291. See also Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166 (recognizing that "defendant's
attorney [must] actively represent[ ] conflicting interests").9
The Cuyler "actual conflict" standard is often stated as requiring no showing
of prejudice. See, e.g., Taylor, 947 P.2d at 686; Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 291. According to
the United States Supreme Court, however, that is not analytically correct. All
violations of the right to effective counsel require some proof of prejudice:
Counsel cannot be "ineffective" unless his mistakes have harmed the
defense (or, at least unless it is reasonably likely that they have). Thus,
a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation is
not "complete" until the defendant is prejudice.
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140,147 (2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
685). Under a general Strickland standard, a defendant must show both that his
counsel performed deficiently and that there is a reasonable probability that the
deficient performance affected the outcome of the case. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 165.
Under the more specific Cuyler analysis, prejudice is not separately analyzed. See id.
at 171-172 & n.5. Rather, it is treated as an integral component of the actual conflict
determination; in that, an actual conflict exists only if counsel's divided loyalties
"actually affected the adequacy of [his] representation." Id. See also Gardner v.
Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 621-622 (Utah 1994) (recognizing that animosity between

9

Cuyler addressed the standard to be applied when a conflict issue is raised
for the first time post-verdict. Its definition of "actual conflict" has since been
applied to substitution motions raised at trial. See Lovell, 1999 UT 40, H 22 & 28.
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defendant and counsel insufficient to establish actual conflict; defendant must
demonstrate how animosity adversely affected counsel's representation), cert,
denied, 516 U.S. 828 (1995).
In sum, the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel guarantees an
indigent defendant ''the assistance of a competent member of the Bar, who
demonstrates a willingness to identify himself with the interests of the defendant
and who will assert such defenses as are available to him under the law and
consistent with the ethics of the profession/ 7 Kryger v. Turner, 479 P.2d 477, 480
(Utah 1971). It does not accord an indigent defendant an "unbridled right to reject
assigned counsel and demand another/' McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir.
1981) (citation and internal marks omitted). Thus, an indigent defendant is not
entitled to substitute one appointed counsel for another unless "good cause"
justifies the substitution. See State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 382 (Utah App. 1997);
Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 272.
Establishment of good cause is a heavy burden. State v. Pando, 2005 UT App
384, | 27, 122 P.3d 672. It requires a defendant to show either that his assigned
attorney has an actual conflict of interest or that there otherwise was a complete
breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. See Lovell, 1999 UT 40, ^f 30; Scales,
946 P.2d at 382. This high standard allows trial courts to maintain "orderly
procedure" by minimizing delays caused by manipulative requests for substitution
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of counsel. See United States v. Doe, 272 F.3d 116,122 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing that
"courts must impose restraints on the right to reassignment of counsel in order to
avoid the defendant's manipulation of the right 'so as to obstruct the orderly
procedure in the courts or to interfere with the fair administration of justice'")
(quoting Mckee, 649 F.2d at 931; other citations omitted), certdenied, 527 U.S. 851
(2002). See also Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 273 (recognizing that courts in considering a
defendant's request for substitution of counsel should consider potential "for
manipulation of the system" through delays).
Here, Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his midtrial motion
for substation of counsel because: (1) an actual conflict existed; and (2) the court
failed to adequately inquire into the conflict. Neither claim has merit. Both are
discussed below.10
C. The trial court adequately inquired into the complaints and friction
between Defendant and his attorneys,
"[W]hen a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with counsel, a trial court
'must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determined the nature of the
defendant's complaints.'" Pando, 2005 UT app 384, ^ 24 (quoting Lovell, 1999 UT 40,
If 27). The court should use the inquiry to "apprise itself of the facts necessary to
In this case, Defendant argues only that his attorneys labored under an
actual conflict of interest, as defined by Cuyler. See Br.Aplt. at 37. He does not claim
that his attorneys were otherwise ineffective under a general Strickland standard.
See id. at 24-37.
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determine whether the defendant's relationship with h i s . . . appointed attorney has
deteriorated to the point that sound discretion requires substitution or even to such
an extent that his . . . right to counsel would be violated but for substitution/ 7
Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 273.
The scope of the inquiry is determined by the facts asserted; but this Court
has cautioned trial courts not to summarily reject even "disingenuous" and
" manipulate[ive]" complaints without some inquiry. See id, at 273. Nevertheless, a
trial court's failure to conduct an adequate inquiry —or any inquiry —does not
mandate reversal.

See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174 (holding that lack of inquiry

constitutes harmless error unless defendant shows that conflict actually adversely
affected counsel's performance). See also Lovell, 1999 UT 40, ^ 27-29 (same); State v.
Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, ^

13-14,27 P.3d 573 (holding lack of adequate inquiry

harmless).
Defendant asserts that before rejecting his midtrial substitution motion, the
trial court only perfunctorily inquired into his complaints with and the friction felt
by his attorneys. See BrAplt. at 24, 35-37. Defendant does not, however, directly
attack the adequacy of the court's pretrial inquiry into his initial complaints. See id.
He instead uses the initial complaints from the first inquiry— which he re-raised in
part in the midtrial m o t i o n - t o allege that the attorney-client relationship had
deteriorated as a result of his attorneys' fear of him. See id. at 29-30, 35.
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Nevertheless, the court's pretrial inquiry is illustrative of the court's
willingness to fairly consider Defendant's complaints. Before trial, the court
thoroughly inquired into Defendant's complaint regarding his attorneys' refusal to
file a motion to suppress — going so far as to review the father's statement to confirm
that no basis for suppression existed. See Statement of the Case at 8-9. The courts also
thoroughly inquired into the claimed lack of communication regarding the DCFS
records and found the attorneys had communicated this information to Defendant
and were regularly communicating with him. Id. And although the court found
that Defendant's pretrial complaints were wholly without basis, the court
nevertheless encouraged Defendant to "voice" any other complaints that might arise
in the future. Id.
Similarly, just before the midtrial inquiry, the court expended extra effort to
consider Defendant's perspective of events. For example, when the court ruled that
Shreve's attempted impeachment of Jimenez was improper, Defendant argued with
the judge. R343:114-116. Over the night recess, the judge again reviewed the
preliminary hearing transcript and even the trial tape to ensure that its original
ruling was correct. R344:14-15.
During the midtrial inquiry, the court continued to maintain the same fair
attitude. The court spent considerable time discussing the intimidation concerns
with the presiding judge (Judge Hilderj and then with the defense attorneys and
35
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Defendant. See Statement of the Case at 13-18. Only after these discussions, did the
court rule that no actual conflict or other good cause existed for substitution.
R344:24. See also Add. E.

Below, Defendant never claimed that the trial court lacked sufficient
information to rule on the midtrial motion. But now, for the first time on appeal,
Defendant chastises the trial court for not further questioning the attorneys about
the specifics of the intimidation. See Br.Aplt. at 35. At the same time, he suggests
that the defense attorneys may have revealed too much in that they divulged
confidential information that they ethically should not have. Id. at 33-34.
The record reflects, however, that the trial court and the defense attorneys
were acutely aware of attorney-client privilege and carefully avoided violating it in
discussing the intimidation. See Statement of the Case at 14-15. See also Add. E. The
attorneys never disclosed any confidential statements or specific threats that
Defendant might have made.

At most, they revealed to Judge Hilder that

Defendant had once stared them down. R344:135. Moreover, even apart from what
the defense attorneys may have revealed, the trial judge was fully aware of
Defendant's intimidation methods. Defendant frequently argued with the judge
over rulings. R343:114-116; R344:16-17,26-28. And at one point, he tried to stare
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down the judge-just as he had apparently tried to stare down his attorneys.11
R433:27-28.
Moreover, during the midtrial inquiry, the defense attorneys appropriately
focused less on what Defendant did or said, and more on their own feelings and
reactions. Despite being experienced legal defenders who had previously defended
difficult and/ or intimidating clients, the attorneys expressed that what they now felt
was different. R344:7,24,136. Yet, despite these feelings, they said that they had not
foregone any legitimate defenses. R344:136-137. Rather, the intimidation had only
caused Shreve to ask an improper question of Jimenez. R344:7,136. But neither Tan
nor Shreve revealed that the question had come directly from a note Defendant
handed her during trial. Defendant disclosed this fact. R344:16. And when he did,
he did not deny pressuring Shreve to ask the question; he opined only that she
might have misunderstood the question he wanted asked. Id.

11

In any case, even if the attorneys had improperly revealed confidences, as
suggested by Defendant, this alone would not establish a Sixth Amendment
violation. Cuyler's actual conflict rule is not designed "to enforce the Canons of
Legal Ethics, but to apply prophylaxis in situations where Strickland itself is
evidently inadequate to assure vindication of the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel/7 Mickens, 535 U.S. at 176. Consequently, a "breach of an ethical
standard does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment." Id.
(quoting Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157,165 (1986)). See also Gardner, 888 P.2d at 621
(holding ethical impropriety alone does not establish actual conflict unless "harm
accrued" to defendant).
37
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More importantly, the trial court did not need to determine if Defendant had
intentionally intimidated his attorneys to properly rule on the substitution motion.
The court only needed to resolve if the intimidation perceived by the attorneys was
causing them to have divided loyalties that actually affected their performance.
Knowing what Defendant specifically said or did to the attorneys would not have
added to the court's understanding of the situation. Indeed, even if Defendant
intentionally threatened the attorneys, substitution of counsel was not mandated,
unless the threat caused the attorneys to actively act against Defendant's best
interests. See Subsection B, supra.
In sum, the court sufficiently appraised itself of the facts before denying the
midtrial motion for substitution.
D. The trial court correctly determined that no actual conflict of interest
existed.
As raised here, substitution of counsel was only mandated if Defendant
established that an actual conflict of interest existed. See Subsection B at 29-32.
Defendant asserts that an actual conflict existed because his attorneys felt
intimidated by him. Br.Aplt. at 27-36. In support, he claims that the intimidation
caused his attorneys not to inform him of the progress of the case, as evidenced by
their alleged failure to inform him of the denial of the severance motion. Id. at 29.
He claims it caused his attorneys to make "poor strategic choices," as evidenced by

38

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the attempted impeachment and the defense closing argument. Id. at 30, 32. And
he argues that an actual conflict was evident because LDA withdrew from the case
before sentencing; Shreve reported being followed; and the attorneys expressed
concern over whether they could zealously represent Defendant. Id. at 29-31. At the
same time, Defendant admits he " created these conflicts/7 but argues that fact is of
little consequence, because he did not" threaten violence or extreme measures/' Id.
at 31. The claims have no merit.
i.

Defendant's contribution to friction.

Defendant asserts that courts "frequently" allow defendants to obtain new
counsel even when the defendant created the conflict. See Br.Aplt. at 31-32. None of
the cases cited by Defendant, however, support the proposition that new counsel is
mandated whenever a defendant threatens his existing appointed attorney.12
Indeed, the law is to the contrary. As the trial court correctly recognized, a
defendant may not intimidate his existing counsel and then legitimately claim that
17

See, e.g., People v. Parker, 2002 WL187081 (Cal. App.) (unpublished opinion noting
without analysis that mistrial was declared after Parker threatened to kill first one
and then another appointed attorney); State v. Toste, 504 A.2d 1036, 1046 (Conn.
1986) (speedy trial case noting without discussion that some delay resulted when
two successive attorneys withdraw after Toste threatened their lives); State v. Brillon,
2008 VT 35, f 31, 955 A.2d 1108, (speedy trial case noting without discussion that
some delay resulted when assigned counsel withdrew after Brillion threatened him),
rev'd on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 1283 (2009); and People v. Manuel, 39 A.D.3d 1185,
834 N.Y.S.2d 790 (N.Y. Sup. 2007) (speedy trial case noting without analysis that
delays caused by successive substitutions of counsel were due to Manuel's threats).
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the intimidation mandates the appointment of new counsel See Doe, 272 F.3d at 126
(recognizing that if defendant's threats created actual conflict, defendants would be
"potentially encouraged... to take such action in the hopes of having an avenue to
later seek reversal of a conviction"); Scales, 946 P.2d at 382 (holding that "who is to
blame" for attorney-client breakdown "significantly affects whether the breakdown
constitutionally requires" substitution of appointed counsel).
Here, the trial court properly considered Defendant's role in creating the
friction with his attorneys. R344:24,27-28. As discussed, Defendant never denied
the intimidation. He also acknowledged that he wanted his attorneys to file a
motion to suppress — even though he was told the motion was frivolous and the
statement was not being introduced at trial. He claimed that his attorneys were not
communicating with him, when they were. And he claimed that he was not in court
during the severance hearing, when he was. See Statement of the Case at 8-9,18.
Although Tan and Shreve were experienced and respected legal defenders,
they found Defendant to be difficult. The judge confirmed this sentiment based on
his own dealings with Defendant, telling Defendant that he was the most difficult
defendant the judge had ever encountered. R344:5-7,27-28,135-136.
But despite these problems, the attorneys continued to actively represent him.
See Statement of the Case at 19-21. In denying the midtrial motion, the court properly
considered that difficulties in the attorney-client relationship derived from
40
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Defendant's own subjective perceptions of events, and not from a lack of trying on
Tan and Shreve's part. See Scales, 946 P.2d at 382; Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 274 (both
recognizing defendant's subjective perceptions do not create good cause). See also
McKee, 649 F.2d at 932 (same).
ii. Defense attorneys' statements and actions.
Next, Defendant asserts that the defense attorneys' own statements and
actions establish an actual conflict. They do not. .
Defendant asserts, for example, that Shreve's concern over being followed
reflects an actual conflict. See Br.Aplt. at 30. Shreve told the police that she was
followed home the first night of trial, but she did not report this to the court during
trial. The court inadvertently learned of the incident from a third person after trial
and then discussed it with counsel. See n.5 and Add. H. In that discussion, Shreve
clarified that she did not know if the incident was related to Defendant's trial. Id.
She certainly knew that Defendant did not follow her, because he was in jail. But
whatever speculation she may have had about who followed her, she did not let the
incident impact her willingness to proceed with Defendant's trial. R344:ll-13.
Following the incident, she continued to actively advocate on behalf of Defendant.
See Statement of the Case at 19-20. Thus, the incident does not support that an actual
conflict existed. It only helps to explain why Shreve felt intimidated.
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Defendant next cites his attorneys' isolated statement that they wondered if
they could continue to zealously represent Defendant. They, however, repudiated
this statement when further questioned. The attorneys told Judge Hilder, when
they discussed Shreve's admonishment with him, that they were concerned about
their ability to continue to represent Defendant. R344:5-7,136. But upon further
reflection, they told the trial judge the next day that they could zealously represent
Defendant. R344:7,13,23-24. Although Defendant suggests that the attorneys7
opinions should be given little weight, see Br.Aplt. at 33, the judge was entitled to
credit them. R344:24. Moreover, the record bears out that after this discussion, the
attorneys continued to actively advocate on Defendant's behalf. See Statement of the
Case at 19-21.
Contrary to Defendant's assertion, see Br.Aplt. at 34, LDA's post-verdict
withdrawal from the case also does not support the existence of an actual conflict.
As explained to Defendant during the midtrial inquiry, assigned counsel is often
changed post-verdict to facilitate raising an ineffective trial counsel claim. R344:1619. Here, that is exactly what occurred. By withdrawing from the case, LDA
allowed new conflicts counsel to be appointed; and new counsel then filed —but
ultimately withdrew —a new trial motion alleging LDA's ineffectiveness. R337342,347.
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iii. The attempted impeachment and closing argument.
Defendant further claims that the intimidation caused his attorneys to make
poor strategic choices, as evidenced by the attempted impeachment and the
concessions his counsel made in closing argument. See BrAplt. at 30. But neither of
these choices establishes an actual conflict.
The trial court characterized Shreve's attempted impeachment of Jimenez as
improper because she lacked a good faith basis to ask the impeachment question.
See Statement of the Case at 11-12,15. But the court's admonishment does not support
that an actual conflict existed, because the attempted impeachment was not adverse
to Defendant's interests. See Subsection B, supra. To the contrary, Shreve was
attempting to do what Defendant wanted. And the question she asked was
consistent with the defense theory that Jimenez knew Defendant better than he was
admitting and had falsely accused Defendant to cover up his own misconduct in
giving away store items for free. See Statement of the Case at 11.
Turning to the closing argument, defense attorney Tan argued that Defendant
lacked the intent to kill Teresa. See Statement of the Case at 20-21. See also Add. G. He
also suggested that Jimenez's account of the robbery was not credible. Id. But Tan
otherwise conceded Defendant's guilt of the lesser crime of aggravated assault, the
two domestic violence charges, and interference with an arresting officer. Id.
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Concessions of guilt in closing argument may support the existence of an
actual conflict of interest or a total breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, but
only when there was a complete lack of defense at trial. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.
685, 696-697 (2002) (clarifying that prejudice is presumed only "if counsel entirely
fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing," that is, only
when "the attorney's failure . . . [is] complete") (emphasis in Bell) (citation and
internal marks omitted). Accord Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, f 32,194 P.3d 913.
In contrast, where — as here — defense counsel actively participates at critical
stages of the proceedings, but then chooses to concede guilt in closing, that decision
is judged under general Strickland standards. In other words, Defendant must show
that counsel's choice of argument was deficient and that the argument unfairly
prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings. See Bell, 535 U.S. at 697-699. Defendant,
however, makes no Strickland argument. See n.10, supra. He claims only that the
closing argument evidences the existence of an actual conflict. See Br.Aplt. at 32-37.
It does not.
It is well-recognized that an attorney who actively advocates for a defendant
during trial may choose to concede some guilt in closing argument, if in doing so,
the defense gains credibility or other strategic advantage. See Florida v. Nixon, 543
U.S. 175,189 (2004) (holding attorney's concession of defendant's guilt in guilt phase
of capital trial not necessarily deficit). See also Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276, 29544
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296 (4th Cir. 2000) (upholding counsel's decision to make "tactical retreat [but not]
complete surrender" in conceding guilt in closing argument), cert, denied, 531 U.S.
1193 (2001); Young v. Catoe, 205 F.3d 750 (4th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 531 U.S. 868
(2000); Goodwin v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 301,310-311 (6th Cir. 2011) (upholding counsel's
decision to concede guilt to robbery to increase credibility of argument that
defendant did not kill victim); Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473,474 (7th Cir. 1991)
(upholding counsel's decision to compare overwhelming evidence of defendant's
guilt of kidnapping to lack of evidence of defendant's intent to rape); McNeal v.
Wainwright, 722 F.2d 674, 676 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding concession of guilt was
reasonable strategic decision); and Atwater v. State, 788 So.2d 233,230-232 (Fla. 2001)
(same).
This is what occurred here. The defense attorneys actively attempted to poke
holes in the prosecution's case where they credibly could: they minimized Teresa's
injuries by eliciting from the doctor the non-critical nature of the injuries; they kept
out all references to Teresa as a "victim"; they kept out all references to Defendant's
other bad acts; they attempted to explore the possibility of a self-defense claim; they
attacked Jimenez's credibility and motive; and they moved for a directed verdict of
acquittal on the attempted murder charge. See Statement of the Case, supra. In sum,
the attorneys actively represented Defendant to the degree that they credibility and
ethically could. See Kryger, 479 P.2d at 480 (recognizing that attorney only obligated
45
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to "assert such defenses as are available to him under the law and consistent with
the ethics of the profession"). This permissibly included their decision to only argue
what was credible in closing.
The strategy worked. Despite Defendant's expressed intent to kill Teresa as
//

pay[ment] ,/ for sleeping with his brother, the jury found that Defendant lacked the

intent to kill and convicted him of the lesser charge of aggravated assault. See
Statement of the Case at 21. The jury did not agree, however, that Jimenez was not
credible and convicted Defendant of robbery.

Id. And as defense counsel

acknowledged and the jury legitimately found, there were no viable defenses to the
two domestic violence charges and the interference charge. Id.
In sum, counsels' choice of argument does not establish that an actual conflict
exists; it negates it. For in conceding some indisputable criminal conduct to gain
credibility in challenging the attempted murder charge, the attorneys reduced
Defendant's potential time prison sentence from life to fifteen years. See Bredehoft,
966 P.2d at 292 (recognizing no conflict exists when attorney and defendant have
"single, shared goal of [defendant's] exoneration"). See also Doe, 272 F.3d at 126
(recognizing that defendant's threats towards attorney "would actually cause
[attorney] to do his best to obtain an acquittal, so that [defendant] would be placated
and would not cause any harm to befall either [attorney] or his family").
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iv. The substitution motion's timing.
Finally, although Defendant does not discuss the timing of his motion, the fact
that the motion was raised midtrial further supports its denial.
"[M]otions for substitute counsel are less likely to be granted when they
would result in . . . mistrial or otherwise impede the prompt administration of
justice." See Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 273. Because such motions typically result in
substantial delay, they have great"propensity for manipulation of the process by
criminal defendants." Id. Indeed, when a mistrial is declared, there is always a
resultant possibility that retrial will be constitutionally or statutorily barred. See
U.S. CONST., amend. V; UTAH CONST., art. 1, § 12 (both prohibiting being placed in
jeopardy twice for same offense); UTAH CODE ANN. § 764-403 (West 2004) (setting
forth when retrial permissible after mistrial). See also West Valley v. Patten, 1999 UT
App 149, \ 18, 981 P.2d 420 (holding that double jeopardy barred retrial, where
judge erroneously declared mistrial believing that actual conflict of interest existed).
Accordingly, trial courts are granted great discretion in ruling on midtrial motions
for substitution of counsel. See McKee, 649 F.2d at 931.
Here, the trial court properly considered the fact that granting the midtrial
motion would result in mistrial. R344:16-17,19. The court explained to Defendant
that it could not simply substitute counsel at that stage of the proceedings since his
new attorneys would need time to prepare for trial. 'Id. at 19. The court further
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explained that if Defendant disagreed with his trial attorneys7 strategic choices, he
could obtain new counsel on appeal and raise an ineffectiveness assistance of
counsel claim. Id. at 16-17. Although mistrial would have been mandated if an
actual conflict existed; because no actual conflict was established, the trial court
properly considered the timing of the midtrial motion in denying it.
•k k k "k k

In sum, the trial court fully inquired into the complaints and friction between
Defendant and his attorneys, correctly determined that none amounted to an actual
conflict of interest or equivalent good cause, and properly exercised its discretion in
denying the midtrial motion for substitution.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's convictions.
Respectfully submitted October 31, 2011.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

IHRISTINE F. SOLTIS

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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THE COURT: All right. Are you ready to go forward
in the*matter of State vs. Julio Martinez?
MS. JOHNSON:
MR. TAN:

We are, your Honor.

We are, your Honor.

This is the State of Utah vs. Julio Martinez.

It's

Case No. 091903723. Will those who are entering their
appearances do so for the record, please.
MS. JOHNSON:

Sandy Johnson and Gregory Ferbrache for

the State.
MR. TAN:

Patrick Tan and Charity Shreve for

Mr. Martinez.
UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Ms. (inaudible) for the alleged
victims, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

I have received this

afternoon and reviewed a copy of a handwritten motion for
ineffective counsel of plan of action to request a new
appointed IDA on the case in order to allow the defendant new
appointed counsel on the case as well.
MS. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

I understand that this was set at the

request of defense counsel.
MR. TAN:

You've also seen these?

Is that correct?

That's correct, your Honor.
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2
3

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Tan, let's have you come
on up here.
Mr. Tan, I'm going to confess that I've read this and

4

frankly don't understand it.

5

little bit.

6
7

MR. TAN: All right.

10

I can do that, your Honor. As

far as some of the language and the wording I myself am a

8 j little bit confused as well.
9

I want you to enlighten me a

And if that's the case I would

ask that the court inquire of Mr. Martinez.
I did get a chance to visit with Mr. Martinez, I

11

believe it was back on Wednesday of this week.

12

had a visit with Mr. Martinez last Friday.

13
14

Ms. Shreve also

And as far as background on this letter or court
document, however the Court wishes to refer to it, this came

15 I about as of late during one of our visits with Mr. Martinez at
16

the jail where Ms. Shreve and I were there.

17

discussion with Mr. Martinez in regards to preparing for the

18

jury trial. And --

19

THE COURT:

20

as you are moving along here.

We had a

I don't want you to waive any privileges

21

MR. TAN:

I understand that, your Honor.

22

To put it vaguely so to speak, xMr. Martinez did not

23

like some of the assessments that I gave him and also that

24

Ms. Shreve gave him in regards to the jury trial, to the issues

25

in the jury trial. And as a result I believe then this letter
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came about.
I also as of last week received a message from my
secretary while I was in court that Mr. Martinez had called
inquiring who the assigned attorney was to the case and my
secretary indicated that it was Ms. Grinly Fair.

And it was at

that time that we realized that Mr. Martinez was planning on
writing a letter to the court and sending a copy to the State
and also one to Ms. Shreve and I. At that point because I had
court on Friday, Ms. Shreve had some free time last Friday, I
asked her to go down there and advise Mr. Martinez that it's
not wise to submit correspondence to the State without us
having looked at it first. And so he was given that
information.
It was at that point that Mr. Martinez in
essence indicated that unless we met a list of his demands, so
to speak, he was going to send this letter out.

So Ms. Shreve

came back to the office and conveyed that to me.

I too then

went out to visit -THE COURT:

I'm going to stop you.

One of the things

that I've done before in similar circumstances is had this done
outside the presence of the DA for --in terms of the
discussions that may have taken place in a sealed filing so
that counsel can without running the risk of violating the
attorney/client privilege apprize the court of the
communications.

I don't know how you feel about that in this
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particular case. Or frankly, if it!s necessary perhaps what I
ought to do is speak with Mr. Martinez first and then make that
decision.
Ms. Johnson?
MS. JOHNSON:

Well, your Honor, with regards to the

attorney/client privilege, I believe Mr. Martinez is asserting
ineffective assistance of counsel which I believe waives the
prejudice privilege.

So I don't think there's an issue there.

• As to — and I'll just say this up front. Mr. Tan
called me indicating that Mr. Martinez was attempting to fire
him and then asked when we would like a hearing set, if any.

I

asked it be set as quickly as possible because if we are going
to get new counsel I want to maintain the obvious state we
have.

And so Mr. Tan went to the efforts of contacting

Christine and she quite quickly put this on for today.

So

that's why we're -THE COURT:

I don't know if it's ineffective

assistance or not, though, and part of it would be you'd have
to get into it to figure it out, or whether there's some other
basis for the request.

But let's talk to Mr. Martinez and then

we'll go from there.
Mr. Martinez, come on up here. How are you feeling
today?
THE DEFENDANT: All right.
THE COURT: Are you thinking clearly?
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THE DEFENDANT:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you need an interpreter?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: How good is your English?
THE DEFENDANT:

Very good.

THE COURT: What's the highest level of education
you've had?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Eleventh grade.

So I've received these documents, but as

I said to Mr. Tan, I don't really understand what you are
trying to say.

Can you help enlighten me?

THE DEFENDANT:

Yeah, well, one day we had a -•-

Patrick Tan, my attorney and Charity Shreve came out to the
jail.

We were talking about my case and I got their attention

that in my discovery as soon as Detective --one of the
detectives had hard core evidence stating that I had threatened
my father.

So, therefore, we had went to my father's house and

the next day after this incident had happened and to talk to my
father.

My father (inaudible) to talk•• to his wife which is Ms.

Schaefer.

And Ms. Schaefer, she talked to the detective and

the detective got a written statement from her.

And I got

their attention that they are going to try to use this to try
to convict me on these charges.
THE COURT: You've got to slow down for me for a
second.

And let's back up for just a second.

And you

Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801) 634-5549
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1

understand that you are entitled to be represented by a lawyer,

2

right?

3

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

4

THE COURT: And you want to be represented by a

5

lawyer?

6 I

THE DEFENDANT: That's going to help me, yes.

7

THE COURT: Okay. You understand that if you can't

8

afford a lawyer, I will appoint one to represent you, right?

9

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

10

THE COURT: And that's what's happened here?

11

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

12

THE COURT: Do you also understand, however, that in

13

this case in that circumstance you are not entitled to a lawyer

14

of your choosing?

15 i

THE DEFENDANT: I understand that.

16

THE COURT: So there needs to be good cause for why I

17

would interject myself in this relationship. Okay?

18

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

19

THE COURT: And that's what I want you -- I think

20 I what you .are trying to do is help me understand why you think
21

there's good cause for me to interject myself and have new

22

counsel appointed.

23

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

24

THE COURT: All right.

25

THE DEFENDANT: So, therefore, I've got their
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attention.

I want to file a motion to suppress evidence based

on the Detective (inaudible) had hard evidence that I had
threatened my father and that was the purpose of why I went
down to my father's house to talk to my father.
THE COURT:

File a motion to suppress what evidence?

THE DEFENDANT:

The evidence that the detective is

saying that he has that I threatened my father the night of
this, the incident happened.
THE COURT: And what would your basis for this motion
to suppress be?
THE DEFENDANT:

Why do they have a statement from

somebody that wasn't there at the time of the incident that
happened, you know?

That's what I'm looking at because as far

as I can see they are going to try to use that statement, you
know, to make me look like I'm guilty.
THE COURT:

I'm listening.

THE DEFENDANT:

And they are arguing we have, you

know, just like when we have trial for the motion to bring that
all out, the paperwork from the Work Force Services I ain't
never heard nothing about that.
What's happened with that.

I heard no results of that.

I ain't heard nothing, almost

nothing -THE COURT:
really twofold?

So can I categorize your complaints as

One that you believe that there is a motion to

suppress to be filed out there, that they have refused to file
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1

and that is the ineffectiveness claim?

2

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

3 I

THE COURT: And two that you are having inadequate

4

communications?

5

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

6

THE COURT:

Okay. Are there other --in specific you

7

are thinking about not the Work Force Services but what the --

8

was it from the Division of Family and Child Services?

9

THE DEFENDANT:

10

The incident where Mrs. Martinez --

tried to commences

11

THE COURT:

We're talking about the DCFS records,

12

right, not the Work Force -- anything to do with Work Force

13

Services, right?

14

THE DEFENDANT:

The issues with DCFS.

15

THE COURT:

16

THE DEFENDANT: No other issues.

17 J

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Tan, you have evaluated

Okay.

18

this request for a motion?

19

' MR. TAN:

Is there anything else?

Yes, your Honor.

20

THE COURT: And?

21

MR. TAN: And your Honor, if I may respond to that.

22

Not only that I evaluated it, I actually met with Ms. Shreve.

23

We discussed it together. And basically putting both of our

24

legal trial experiences as legal defenders, as trial attorneys,

25

we looked at the issues. And we simply could not see any legal
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basis to file this motion.

And Ms. Shreve indicated to me her

concern is as officers of the Court we should not be filing for
these motions.

And having looked at the issue, looked at.--

THE COURT:

Is there any indication of a.

constitutional infirmity here?
MR. TAN:

Not that we can see, your Honor.

THE COURT:
description.

Because I don!t hear one from the

I mean you are not saying it was an inappropriate

search or anything like that?

You are saying they got a

statement from somebody you don't believe is there?
THE. DEFENDANT:

It was illegal.

It was an illegal

statement they received.
THE COURT:

How is it an illegal statement?

THE DEFENDANT:

Because the person wasn't there when

the incident happened (inaudible.)
MR. TAN:

And as I indicated, your Honor, when

Ms. Shreve and I met to go over legal issues, this is one that
we discussed.

As I indicated based on my experience as a

criminal defense attorney and Ms. Shreve's experience as a
criminal defense attorney, both concluded that for the time
being there were no legal grounds that this motion to suppress
as Mr. Martinez requested would be warranted.

Ms. Shreve

expressed her concern and I have the same concerns that we as
officers of the court, we file a frivolous motion, we would be
subject to sanctions.

So that's one of the reasons why we
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1
2

didn't file this motion.
The other reason that we did not act upon filing this

3

motion, if there were grounds to begin with, as my

4

understanding, and I talked to Ms. Johnson about this, that the

5

statement in question of which I believe is Mr. Martinez's

6

father, my understanding is the State is not planning on having

7

this witness in their case in chief.

8

and he is I guess a standby witness on rebuttal so that if

9

Mr. Martinez gets on the stand, testifies and somehow opens the

10
11

He has been subpoenaed

door, then maybe these statements will come in.
But, you know, without actually doing the trial and

12

knowing what will be said, that was the other issue is,

13

frankly, if there is an issue, if it's not ripe to file

14

anything at this point.

15
16
17

Those are the two reasons that Ms. Shreve and I did
not follow that request that Mr. Martinez -THE COURT:

'

So there might be an evidentiary reason

18

to exclude the statements but not a constitutional.

19

there's not -- there's not a constitutional problem in your

20

view that justifies a motion to suppress?

21

MR. TAN:

22 j

THE COURT: All right.

23
24
25

But

That's correct, your Honor.
It may or may not be an

evidentiary problem depending on how things unfold?
MR. TAN:

Yes. But my understanding having had a

chance to talk to Ms. Johnson earlier around 2:00 o'clock today
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is that Mr. Martinez!s father has been subpoenaed but that the
State was not intending to putting this witness on the stand
unless the door gets opened based on Mr. Martinez's testimony
or and somehow they need to have him testify.
THE COURT: What about the allegations that you have
been dilatory in communicating with Mr. Martinez?
MR. TAN:

I can address that as well, your Honor.

Your Honor, this is a steno pad I take with me to the jail and
I usually make my visits out to the jail once a week.

I have a

list on my door that I basically have my secretary put down
names of clients that want a visit.

And I take this because

the jail sometimes doesn't allow me to carry all the same for
safety purposes.
And I have documented the times that I have visited
with Mr. Martinez. And I can say that Mr. Martinez is a
regular client that I visit on a frequent basis.

I -- just as

a rough estimate I would say that either Ms. Shreve or myself
or sometimes both of us would visit Mr. Martinez at the Salt
Lake County Jail at least three out of the four weeks each
month, and sometimes more than that when there are pressing
issues and when there are discovery issues or anything that we
want to update on.
If I can't be there, Ms. Shreve is there.

If she

can't be there, I'm there.

Sometimes we are both there. We

keep a very careful record.

We keep track of all of these
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1

visits. And I can honestly represent to the Court that because

2

of the severity of the case that both Ms. Shreve and I have

3

visited Mr. Martinez more than most of my other clients. And

4

so I have a record of that.

5

of that as well.

6

I believe Ms. Shreve has a record

THE COURT: All right. How much time would you say

7

on average you spend during these visits?

8 I
9

MR. TAN:

I would say sometimes we have maybe just 15

minute conversations if there's no updates.

Sometimes we have

10

conversations over an hour depending on what it is that we have

11

to report back to Mr. Martinez on.

12

We do make it a rigor pattern of just going and

13

talking to him even if it's just simply to say we're still

14

looking into getting this piece of evidence for you but our

15

investigator has not received it yet.

16

that conversation and that visit. But sometimes Ms. Shreve and

17

I would go and sit down with Mr. Martinez and we would talk

18

about issues, defenses and specifically this self-defense.

19

THE COURT:

20

That's maybe the gist of

In particular have you spoken about the

DCFS issues?

21

MR. TAN:

22 j

THE COURT: Again, without revealing any privilege,

23

can you disclose the extent of those conversations?

24
25

Yes, your Honor, we have..

MR. TAN: And, your Honor, I will only speak for
myself.

I want also to allow Ms. Shreve to also address that
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as well because she has been the one that has done more
research and actually filed the motion in trying to get those
DCFS records.
THE COURT:

Let me put it this way.

Have you

communicated to him the results of your efforts?
MR. TAN:

Yes, I have, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Ms. Shreve?

MS. SHREVE: Yes.
THE COURT: All right.

They tell me they have told

you.
THE DEFENDANT:

Okay.

Well, I didn't hear no results

of the DCFS issue until when Mr. Tan came and saw me Wednesday.
And he didn't tell me it, I had to ask him why haven't you guys
told me this?
that.

They came out and saw me.

I'm not going to deny

They came out and saw me at the jail several times based

on me calling them now that I needed to talk to them.

That's

when they would come out.
THE COURT:

I'm struggling to see what the real

problem is here, Mr. Martinez, to be blunt with you.

Let's --

the issue-- regarding the father back me up one more time.
They have a statement from your father?
THE DEFENDANT: No, they don't have a statement from
my father.

The Detective O'Connell he stated to me (inaudible)

that he has hard evidence about my father
THE COURT:

That you have threatened your father?
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1

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that I threatened my father the

2

night of the incident when the incident happened.

3

THE COURT: Okay.

4

THE DEFENDANT: So, therefore, the next day he and

5

another officer had went to my father's house to state to my

6

father for whatever reason I have no idea. So therefore --

7

THE COURT: Does it matter why the detectives would

8 J have chosen -9

THE DEFENDANT: It doesn't matter but, yeah, it does

10

matter in a sense, yeah, because now they are going to try to

11

use that, that written statement mainly look for like I'm

12

guilty --

13

THE COURT: They have the written statement that they

14

obtained from?

15

THE DEFENDANT: From his wife.

16

THE COURT: From his wife.

17

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

18

THE COURT: All right. Have you seen this written

19

statement?

20

MS. SHREVE: Yes.

21

MR. TAN: Yes, your Honor. And I believe --

22 j

THE COURT: was the written statement provided in

23

discovery?

24

MR. TAN: It was, your Honor.

25

THE COURT: May I see it?
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MS. SHREVE: Ms. Schaefer.
MR. TAN:

This is the new Schaefer.

THE COURT: And this is Mr. Martinez!s father's wife?
MS. SHREVE: Yes.
MR. TAN:

I believe it would be his stepmom.

THE COURT:

Stepmom.

THE DEFENDANT:

Your Honor, that's not the only

statement I brought to their attention as well.

The other

statement that's in there is from a Candy Seminole(phonetic)
that works for DCFS, works for Work Services, which
Ms. Martinez's sister-in-law, she's married to her brother.
And she's got a statement, a written statement that she has
witnessed several altercations between me and Mrs. Martinez.
THE COURT:

Let me try - - a motion to suppress is a

motion that says somehow the evidence was illegally or
unconstitutionally obtained.
THE DEFENDANT:

There's no way.

THE COURT: And they are saying we've evaluated it in
those terms and we don't have a good faith basis for bringing
it.

There may be evidentiary reasons, in other words, it may

not come into evidence. And what I hear them saying it may not
be an issue at all, right?

And if it is, depending on what's

said, we'll evaluate it then.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

So do you see what I mean?

I understand what you are saying.

I don't see anything that is deficient at
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all in terms of that evaluation, frankly, at all.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Well --

I've heard just -- what I've seen so far

if they try to bring this as a motion to suppress versus
perhaps, you know, seeking some evidentiary ruling, and Ms.
Shreve is right, what they would get is an ear full based on
just what you told me. Maybe there's something else, I don't
know.
I don't -- what else do you -- they've told you about
the DCFS investigations?
THE DEFENDANT:

Barely on Wednesday because I

questioned about it.
THE COURT:

They've come out and talked to you?

THE DEFENDANT:

Well, when he came out --he came out

Wednesday to talk to me about me sending a letter to you and to
him and then to the district attorney to ask for new counsel.
And he goes what is it I have to do to get copies (inaudible)
make, you know, what's not going right. How do you feel things
not going right -- you know, figure something out, you know.
And I just told him I just don't feel you guys are, you know -that wasn't -- the DCFS issue was a lot.
nothing about.

I haven't heard

Until today you haven't even told me nothing

about the DCFS issues, you guys filing a motion.
know what's going on with that, you know.
. THE COURT:

I don't even

And then I filed --

I still haven't seen those records. Just
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for the record, I mean, you are complaining about I still
haven't seen the records.
';•• THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

That's what he told me (inaudible.)

Yeah, so it's -- there is a lot of delay

here.
THE DEFENDANT:

Yeah.

Well, you now understand

there's a lot of delay here while I was waiting for trial.
That was my main concern is bringing this -- bringing all this
stuff up that, you know, this ain't showing -- this ain't got
this, this ain't got that, but yet they aren't telling me what
we don't got and what we do got. And how are we supposed to be
ready for trial in August in such the report.

That was what my

main concern is I felt I wasn't getting their best --by
defending me.

So that's why I did what I did, write in these

letters to you guys.
THE COURT:

Mr. Martinez, based on what you've told

me so far, I see absolutely no basis for replacing counsel in
this case.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

(Inaudible.)

Okay.

Things might change.

You are

always invited to bring matters to my attention, but if you
have something else to say or other complaints you haven't told
me about, I'm interested in hearing that.

But what you've told

me so far does not in my opinion form the basis for having me
interject myself into this relationship.

Okay?

Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801) 634-5549
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1

THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

2

THE COURT: Ms. Johnson, Mr. Ferbrache --

3

MR. FERBRACHE:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. FERBRACHE: Absolutely not. As far as the issue

Your Honor --

-- do you see it differently?

6

that was brought up with the DCFS records, the AG's office

7

contacted me wanting to know if it was okay to make a copy for

8

the court of that letter in response to the court's order.

9

indicated absolutely.

So I'm expecting it, all the parties

10

involved will receive, receive that contact from the AG's

11

office.

12

THE COURT:

I

I'd like you to pre-docket it,

13

Ms. Shreve, and let's make sure that I have it by, can we say

14

next week?

15

MS. SHREVE:

Here's the issue I've had since the

16

subpoena has been sent, about three conversations with the AG's

17

office calling, needing additional information about Julio and

18

his birthday, then calling back and arranging, then a

19

conversation with Carol Devoia --

20

THE COURT: Verdoai.

21

MS. SHREVE:

-- Verdoia discussing the DCFS records

22 j and then having her looking into, her, her clerk cominn~ back.
23
24
25

So there's been multiple communications.
THE COURT:

Can we set this for June 25th at

9:00 o'clock in the morning just as a status on where we are
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and ask that you --if there's anything you want me to do, if
you all want to get me on the phone with the DCFS as well,
whatever would be helpful in moving this along.
So Ms. Johnson, do you see it differently?
MS. JOHNSON:

No, your Honor, if we received the

answer by June 25th can we just strike that scheduling
conference?
THE COURT:

We can.

I was not referring to that.

I

was referring to the inquiry into this particular issue.
MS. JOHNSON:
court's assessment.

I think we're -- I would agree with the

I believe that Mr. Martinez has the

benefit to excellent attorneys who have been working diligently
on his case.
THE COURT:

Do you have concerns?

Do either of you

have concerns here?
MR. TAN:

Your Honor, the, the only follow up that I

wanted to just address the Court about so Mr. Martinez -- I
understand that the court's ruling is that there are no
ineffective issues thus far.

I want to see, though, if there

are any type of conflict issues.

I, as the court is making its

assessment, I can see that Mr. Martinez is, is not happy and
satisfied with what the court is assessing and saying so far.
I just want to make sure if there are any other conflicts that
might not relate to motions to suppress or DCFS information,
but if there are any other conflicts if, in fact, he feels we
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1

were not visiting him enough, we have not represented him

2

enough, I would like to since we are here address those as

3

well.

4

THE COURT:

Well, I've tried to do that.

I've tried

5

to say two things to just make it clear.

6

you off from future complaints.

7

additional complaints, even if I do not agree with you here,

If, in fact, you have

8 J you always should, you should voice them.
9

One, I'm not cutting

Right?

And two was an inquiry as to whether there was

10

anything else going on that you had complaints about.

I'm not

11

limiting this to just ineffective assistance argument.

I see

12

it as a broader issue in terms of whether there's any good

13

cause for interjecting myself in the relationship.

14

one.

15 J

That's only

But a complete breakdown in communications or another

16

conflict between them.

There are a variety of reasons which

17

might in addition to ineffective assistance constitute a basis

18

for the Court to replace counsel.

19

I find.-- I want to make the record clear I find no

20

basis so far on.any grounds and it's not just limited to this

21

notion of ineffective assistance.

22 s
23

Mr. Martinez, is there anything else that you have to
complain of?

24

THE DEFENDANT: No.

25

THE COURT:

Do you want to think about this, think
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about it a little bit longer and then come back and if you have
other issues that you want to talk to me about?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No, I don't.

Let's have this file lodged -- okay.

Thank you.
MR. TAN:

And your Honor, if we can be excused that's

all we have. /
THE COURT:

Thank you.

(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.)
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cuAsk

Q.

And do you glance at it while you're helping

customers?
A.

Sometimes I do.

Q.

Okay. Were you glancing at it on this occasion?

A.

Irm pretty sure I did.

Q.

And I think you already answered this but I'm going

to ask it again. If you would give gas away for free, you
would lose your job, correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

If another customer saw you give gas away for free

you would lose your job, correct?
A.

Yes.
MS. SHREVE: One moment, your Honor. May I have a

moment?
THE COURT: You may.
Q.

(BY MS. SHREVE) You just testified that you had small

talk but this is the first time you had small talk with him?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Sir, do you remember testifying in a preliminary

hearing?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. Do you remember being sworn in at that

preliminary hearing to tell the truth?
A.

Yeah.
MS. SHREVE: Your Honor, may I approach?
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THE COURT: Yeah.
Q.

(BY MS. SHREVE)

I'm going to have you look at

something and just read it to yourself.
THE COURT: Direct opposing counsel to the page and
line.
MS. SHREVE:

Page 50 the bottom half of that page,

page 49 the bottom half and page 52.
Q.

(BY MS. SHREVE)

Have you had an opportunity?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Do you recall at the preliminary hearing testifying

that you had dozens of conversations before?
A.

Brought it out, it says that. \
MS. JOHNSON:

Your Honor, I'm going to object. I

don't think that's a fair characterization of what she just
read.
THE COURT:

Read it. On a question and answer basis,

read it.
Stick it up there in front of him, you ask the
questions, he can provide the answer.
Where do you want to start, Ms. Johnson, for context
where do you want it to end?
MS, SHREVE:. Just a moment, your Honor,
I'm going to withdraw and let me ask -THE COURT: Nope.

Read it.

Start '-- tell me where

you want it to start from.
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MS. SHREVE:

Page 50 line --

MS. JOHNSON:

Fourteen through 17.

THE COURT: What's the question?
MS. JOHNSON:

Question by defense attorney:

can you give me a rough estimation?

"Okay,

Dozens?"

"Answer: I, I can't really tell you that, but he's
been there.

I've seen him sometimes. You know, sometimes I

don't even ring him up, but you know I see people around."
THE COURT: All right.

You are admonished that that

is an incorrect impeachment.
MS. SHREVE: Okay.
Q.

(BY MS. SHREVE)

But he's been in the store numerous

times before, correct?
A.

Yes.
MS. SHREVE: No further questions, your Honor.
THE COURT: Any redirect?
MS. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

You may step down.

Is this witness

excused?
MS. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Any reason not to excuse this witness?

All ri^ht. Members of the jury we're going to break
I'll see you here at 9:00 o'clock sharp tomorrow morning.
few minutes before would be better, all right?

A

We'll get

started right away.
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1

Counsel, I'd like you here at 8:30.

2

All right. All

rise for the jury.

3

There's a gentleman with a recording device that

4

needs to remain behind as well.

5

(Jury exits the courtroom.)

6

THE COURT:

7

THE DEFENDANT:

You know better than that, Ms. Shreve.
What is it -- I don't understand.

8 I What do you mean when she said -9

THE COURT:

Okay.

10

THE DEFENDANT:

11

THE COURT:

12

I wasn't talking to you.

Yeah, but this is regarding --

I'm sorry.

You sit down.

I wasn't

speaking to you.

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

THE COURT:

15

I don't understand how — •

Ms. Shreve, you know better than that,

right?

16

MS. SHREVE: Right.

17

THE COURT: All right. What was happening was, was

18

the, the words that he said, that he swarred her testimony is

19

not what Ms. Shreve said.

20

testified he had dozens of conversations with you under oath.

21

That is not what that said.

22 j
23

THE DEFENDANT:

What Ms. Shreve said is that he

It says it right here on the

preliminary transcripts.

24

THE COURT:

Really?

25

THE DEFENDANT:

Want to read it again?

Yeah. Do you want me to read it to
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you?
THE COURT: Sure.
THE DEFENDANT:

It says right here.

I don't even -- I don't even count, man.
you, give you a rough estimate?

It says, "Okay.

Okay.

Can I give

That is, I can't really tell

you that, but he doesn't -- there I see him sometimes, you
know, sometimes I don't even ring him up.

But you know I see

people around.
THE COURT: Not even close.
THE DEFENDANT:

So who is saying that then?

THE COURT: All right. We are done with this
discussion.

You can talk to your lawyers.

That is an improper

impeachment.
THE DEFENDANT:

Well, I think I'm going to file an

ineffective counsel on me then because you're not
representing -- you are not going right through the -THE COURT:

Well, you -- you know, you file whatever

you think is appropriate with me.
that.

That's okay.

That is an incorrect impeachment.

I don't mind

I've admonished your

lawyer as a result of that.
I do not read that. You tell me if I am wrong,
Ms. Shreve.

Does that say he had dozens of conversations

the individual?
MS. SHREVE: No.
THE COURT: Mr. Tan?
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1

MR. TAN: No, your Honor.

2

THE COURT:

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

All right.
Well, it's right there in the

transcript.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. FERBRACHE: Your Honor, as to the evidence that's

Okay.

Thank you.

7

been admitted , where would you like us to put that?

8

them being a set of scissors. Don't want to necessarily leave |

9

that out.

10

THE COURT:

11

MS. SHREVE:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. FERBRACHE:

14

]

Give me a copy.

Let me have a copy.

I can -Let me have a copy.
I have a full copy, your Honor. It's

May I approach?

a clean copy.

15

THE COURT:

16

And I think your question was:

17

One of

Yep. Page 50?
You had dozens of

conversations with him, right?

18

MS. SHREVE: Yes, that was my question.

19

THE COURT:

20

Okay.

21

MS. SHREVE: Okay.

22

1 (—* H.
JLJ.XJU

4

Okay.

See you here at 8:30 tomorrow.

^ «vJL )tx ! •

K H ( '( ) n 1 ! 7 !d ( i£*\T~ ~«-><~

2 r__

n r A r i i rs- r-__r i ~\ rv i n__»

23

courtroom.

24

the Warren Jefffs trial where somebody came in and they were

25

able to get a picture of, you know, of an exhibit or what have

And you may not remember, but this all stemmed from
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chambers.
(In chambers.)
THE COURT:

We're without the Defendant in the matter

of State vs. Julio Martinez.
• * Mr. Tan has suggested that there's a motion that the
Defense would like to raise in private.
Mr. Tan.
MS. SHREVE: Well, let me do this first.
issue is yesterday we went to Judge Hilder.

We -- our

We did an ex-parte

because it held sensitive information as in the instructions we
got from our office.

I had --we relayed some information to

Judge Hilder and I then said I had concerns if he told that
information to the trial judge that it would be a problem, and
we addressed how to deal with that and perhaps with the trial
judge.
So I don't know exactly what Judge Hilder said, but I
would like to know in lieu of the motion.

And I would like to

handle it kind of like an ineffective assistance of counsel
hearing where I don't -- I don't necessarily want to stay a
party to it, depending on what the information is.

If it's no

information, then it's no problem.
THE COURT:
you want.

Well, sure.

I'm happy to do that however

I raised it immediately because as soon as he

started talking to me and telling *me anything that was said to
you, I've treated it as an ex-parte communication albeit an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

indirect ex-parte cornmunication. And that's why I instructed

2

the State be put on the phone immediately.

3

I think the best thing to do would be to have Judge

4

Hilder perhaps participate and relate what was said and what

5

have you -- does that make sense?

6

MS. JOHNSON:

But I don't --

Well, your Honor, I think just guessing

7

here, that they would be asking for a recusal based on what

8

Judge Hilder said to your Honor.

9

Judge Hilder knew is important.

10

What was important is what was

relayed to your Honor.--

11

MS. SHREVE: Correct.

12

MS. JOHNSON:

13

So I don't know that what

--by Judge Hilder.

So I don't know

that it necessarily even involved Judge Hilder.

14

MS. SHREVE: Correct.

15

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, you can file a written

16

motion for recusal or ask for recusal, and we can send it to

17

the judge and take a few minutes or whatever.

18

are asking for recusal, we stop the process at this time,

19

suspend the proceedings while --

20

MS. SHREVE:

21
22

I mean, if you

I don't think it would be necessary to

get there.
THE COURT:

Well, it works one of two ways.

If you

23

ask for recusal, the process immediately stops. At that point

24

in time the motion is given to me for decision about whether I

25

say yea or nay.

If I say nay, then automatically under statute
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it goes to the associating presiding judge based on your papers
or your argument for recusal.
And if he believes that there's a basis for recusal,
then he'll recuse me, I I don't.

If he doesn't believe that

there's a basis for recusal, then he won't.
And I don't know what your concern is. You can ---.
you know, I (inaudible.)
If that's fine and the other thing is we can bring in
Judge Hilder, and Judge Hilder can say on the record exactly
what it is that he told me.

Because really it doesn't matter

what -- I think exactly as Ms. Johnson suggested, it doesn't
matter what Judge Hilder was told.
MS. SHREVE:
THE COURT:

It matters to us.
What Judge Hilder would have told me?

MS. SHREVE:

I think that' s probably how it should be

handled.
MR. FERBRACHE:

Your Honor, as we were discussing

this, I think in the case I believe (inaudible) so I understand
that there may not be a decision but Gabe (inaudible).

They

indicated (inaudible).
THE COURT:
in Summit County.

Sure.

I think Judge Hilder right now is

We can do it telephonically.

And I know

he's coming back down, but why don't I -- give me two minutes
to speak with general counsel for the courts since this is an
odd proceeding.

Give you a couple of minutes to talk about the
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process with -MR. FERBRACHE:
THE COURT:

With Heidi.

With Heidi or whoever it is. And then

we'll reconvene in 10 minutes or so.
(Recess taken by the court.)
THE COURT:
was off.

For the record, I'm so sorry, the record

I'm just going to briefly summarize.
We had a conversation off-the-record in which I

recounted the history of this matter and asked you to recount
our conversations.

Would you repeat them please.

JUDGE HILDER:

I'll do my best.

I'm getting better

at it. As I indicated Ms. Shreve and Mr. Tan came in a little
after five at the direction, as I understand, Mr. Anderson or
maybe it was Ms. Buchi to discuss an issue of concern arising
from an ongoing trial at which time she indicated to me that
counsel were having some challenges with their client, the
defendant.

And as Judge Himonas clarified earlier, Mr. Tan

indicated that there was a sense of intimidation and staring
down episode and we did not discuss what was behind that, just
had to do with counsel be given a response there was the stare
down.
THE COURT:

What I remember was you had said, for

exanple, you know, it's stare down, Mr. Tan, insubstantive and
Ms. Shreve was intimidated.
JUDGE HILDER:

And Ms. Shreve had indicated a sense

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FRANCO LIBERTINE - Cross bv MR. TATVT

that, and I use it (inaudible) I think these words from you
which came from counsel that they couldn't really articulate
what it was, but that there was a sense of being compromised in
the ability to exercise a judgment they normally exercise or to
make a decision they would normally make.

Specifically, Ms.

Shreve's comment that having done something later that day,
yesterday, that was against an old judge that she normally
would not have done.
THE COURT:

You indicated there was some sense that

it may have been gender based as well.
.. JUDGE HILDER:

Oh, yeah.

I didn't say -- I told you

that, yes, and I felt like we may have had a Defendant, yeah, I
said to you, and I said this in a more hypothetical sense, and
that's the way I think I said it to you, that it was really in
the area of the discussion I think, Judge Himonas, of options
and whether we should or should not address such issues and
that was there could be some defendants with gender for other
reasons which may be an issue that would, in fact, be better
served by a different counsel appointment.
factor that might have been worked here.

That that was one
I think that's pretty

-- I can't remember anything else. But -- and that's a quick
summary.

Did I give anything else at lunch time?
THE COURT:

There was one other thing that I

mentioned this morning that I didn't mention now, and that is
we had a brief discussion, and I didn't get the sense that the
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1

intimidation was in not putting on something that may be valid

2

and helpful, but that was causing them to do things that they

3

may not otherwise do. And I believe I asked you that this

4

morning, and you termed that. Am I misrecollecting that?

5

MS. SHREVE: No, that's I -- I, after sleeping on it,

6

waking up this morning with some additional security that I

7

felt like I am comfortable to go forward and advocate for my

8

client and not allow this affect my ability to represent him.

9

THE COURT:

The reason we have Judge Hilder here,

10

though, is you were concerned that he may have relayed some

11

information to him that had been relayed to me —

12

MS. SHREVE:

13

THE COURT:

14

That's correct.
-- may cause a basis for recusal. And

what I would suggest is that you just step out for 20 seconds

15 J with Judge Hilder, remind him of what that was.
16
17
18
19

JUDGE HILDER:

Probably there are other things you

told me (inaudible.)
• .MS. SHREVE:

Yeah, I think given the conversation

between --

20

JUDGE HILDER:

You told me -- you did tell me things

21

that would have been a concern of.

I think the only other term

22 j I might have used was that the concern might be an effective
23
24
25

strategy, and that is different -THE COURT:

I leave it up to you.

If you feel like

you want to step outside for a few minutes -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

JUDGE HILDER: Well, I have talked to you, but I know

2

(inaudible) .

3

MS. SHREVE: Yeah, I think given what has been

4

relayed here, I don't think we have a good basis for a motion

5

to recuse --

6

THE COURT: And the red line is on so unless it's off

7

in the courtroom, Judge Hilder --

8 I

JUDGE HILDER: The red light was on last time.

9

THE COURT: They told me they didn't record it.

10
11

JUDGE HILDER:

It didn't record it? I think it

wasn't on there. I think they realized it wasn't on the record

12 here.
13

MS. SHREVE: I thought

14

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Let's make sure.

15

JUDGE HILDER: The light was on. Definitely.

16

THE COURT: Well, thank you. And I'll -- that's a

17

cut in pay.

18

(Out in the courtroom.)

19

THE COURT: Mr. Ferbrache -- let's go on the

20

record -- you've had a chance to consult with advocates for the

21

victim about the conversations we've had in chambers?

22 l

MR. FERBRACHE: I have.

23

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Yes. Yes, your Honor.

24

THE COURT: And based upon the disclosures that have

25

been made, I understand that there is no motion to recuse?
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MR. TAN:

That's right, your Honor.

(Off the record.)
THE COURT:

Okay.

Let's go back on the record in the

matter of the State vs. -- I keep looking at the wrong file and
I'm so sorry -- in the matter of Julio Inez Martinez.
Enez or Inez?

Is it

Or Enez?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

It's Inez.

Inez Martinez. Okay.

Ms. Johnson, will you be conducting the examination?
MS. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

No, Mr. Ferbrache will.

Mr. Ferbrache, do you have to run to the

bathroom again?
MR. FERBRACHE:
THE COURT:

I don't want to admit.

I am so happy you told me that because as

you all know there are two types of people in this world those
that know when something can cause you to stop and those that
won't.

Guess which one I am?
All rise for the jury, please.
Well, was three hours long enough for you for lunch?
You may be seated.

I'm very sorry for the delays.

They were all necessary and I hope you will just trust me about
that.
Call your next witness.
MR. FERBRACHE:
THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

Hello, sir.
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THE COURT:

-k

-k

This is State of Utah vs. Julio Martinez.

It's Case No. 091903723.

Will you enter your appearances,

please.
MS. JOHNSON:

Sandi Johnson and Gregory Ferbrache for

the State.
MR. TAN:

Patrick Tan and Charity Shreve for Julio

Martinez.
THE COURT:

Ms. Johnson, Mr. Ferbrache, are you aware

of last night's developments?
MR. TAN: No.
MS. JOHNSON:

No, your Honor.

THE COURT: At approximately 6:00 p.m. I was
telephoned by the presiding judge, Judge Hilder, informing me
that Mr. Tan and Ms. Shreve had engaged -- I don't think you
had spoke directly with Judge Hilder, had you?
MR. TAN:

We did, your Honor.

THE COURT:

-- that they had engaged in -- I'm not

sure they are inappropriate but ex-parte communications with
Judge Hilder regarding this matter and that Mr. Tan's office
had as well engaged in these communications.

And Mr. Tan, you

correct me if at any time I'm wrong.
I think the gist of the communications was that they
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1

were communicated to me by Judge Hilder is that Mr. Tan and

2

Ms. Shreve feel extremely threatened by their client to the

3

point that they are worried about their ability to put on a

4

defense and feel that they have compromised perhaps by making

5

some bad judgment calls, perhaps last night was an example of

6

one, because of the threats -- I'm saying threats, but that may

7

not be right, but because of the perceived intimidation from

8 J their client, and were in a quandary about what to do with it.
9

And as a result of communicating with the head of their office

10

and with Judge Hilder as well, who telephoned me and with whom

11

I discussed the matter.

12

try to set up a telephone conference so I could relate this

13

information to you and to Mr. Frerbrache as quickly as

14

possible.

15

called me during the evening telling me that she was unable to

16

successfully complete that.

17

MR. TAN:

18

THE COURT: Am I missing anything?

19

MR. TAN:

I directed Judge Hilder to immediately

And I know that Ms. Shreve worked to do that. She

Is that accurate?

It is, your Honor. And I'm --

No, your Honor.

I think that's pretty much

20

a good summary.

21

what we do, we come across situations like these a lot from our

22

clients, but there's just something about this particular

23

individual that raises concerns to us.

24
25

We did indicate to Judge Hilder that part of

THE COURT:

So I thought the first and most

appropriate thing to do, Mr. Ferbrache and Ms. Johnson, was to
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make sure that everybody is obviously playing from a level
playing field and bring those communications to your attention.
MS. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:
here.

I appreciate that.

The second is to decide where you go from

I donft know if you've had any requests whatsoever that

was after having slept on it, perhaps frustration at the
admonishment that Ms. Shreve received at the end of the day.
MR. TAN:

Your Honor, I don't think that is an issue

for Ms. Shreve nor myself.

I think the bigger concern is just

our ability to continue to adequately and zealously represent
Mr. Martinez in trial.
THE COURT:
to represent him.

It's your duty adequately and zealously

And it sounds to me, you correct me if I am

wrong, it's not that you are foregoing legitimate
cross-examination, you are not foregoing the -- and I don't
want you to answer this in any way that would invade the
integrity of the attorney/client privilege or work product,
that it's not that you are foregoing good stuff, it's that
perhaps his intimidation has led you to do things that would
otherwise be against your professional judgment.
MR. TAN:

That's accurate, your Honor.

THE COURT:
MR. TAN:

Okay.

And your Honor, the other concern I have,

and I just checked, I haven't had any messages from Ms. Shreve,
I know when she and I talked last night, the plan was for her
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and I to meet this morning at 8:15.in front of the courtroom so

2

we could further go over the details and have a better game

3

plan to propose to both the Court and the State.

4

she's not here yet also concerns me as well.

The fact that

5

THE COURT:

6

Ms. Johnson is a not nidified to this precise

7

situation.

I also have some concerns as well.

This is very similar to a similar murder case we

8 J handled about a year and a half ago where there was a Defendant
9

who was, to put it mildly, extraordinarily unhappy with the

10

defense that his counsel put on, and following the conclusion

11

of the trial, correct me if I am wrong, Ms. Johnson, brought a

12

motion for a new trial based on a variety of allegations

13

including ineffective assistance of counsel. And we were able

14

then with the hindsight of trial, I mean not in the heat of the

15

battle, to evaluate under what appropriate standards, strict or

16

whatever appropriate standard applies and make an appropriate

17

decision.

18
19

And it seems to me, why should this be any different?
Does the State see it differently?

Understanding this is all

20 i very new to the State and you haven't had a really -21

Mr. Ferbrache and Ms. Johnson a chance to digest this, perhaps

22 I it's unfair to ask you that question right now and just give
23
24
25

you a chance to noodle it.
MS. JOHNSON:

And your Honor, I would appreciate some

time to just discuss that. Without invading the client/lawyer
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relationship, if there have been actual threats of harm
directed toward Ms. Shreve or Mr. Tan, and frankly as a
prosecutor I would have a duty to investigate that because
that's a crime.
THE COURT:

That's a whole different issue.

MS. JOHNSON:

And so I think that's one of those

where if this --if there's legitimate threats of harm being
directed toward them, then that's a different matter than they
feel intimidated by their client.

So I think I would just like

to discuss that with Mr. Tan and Ms. Shreve, if they can
provide at least a little more specifics without invading that
relationship.
THE COURT:

My sense right now, and I'm not going to

get in the way of your work, Ms. Johnson, because you know
extremely well what you are doing, is that it's more of the
latter of the intimidation, but that's not the point.

And if

that's the case, Mr. Tan, my initial reaction is, forgive me
saying this a little bit, but it's -- you've got a duty to your
client and you're also an officer of the Court.

And at some

point you just call, excuse my french, bullshit, and you don't
do things like last night.

Right?

MR. TAN: Yes.
THE COURT:
MR. TAN:

The impeachment.

Yes. And --

THE COURT: And I wanted to talk to Ms. Shreve about
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I'll repeat this to her.

wrong way to do that.

There's a right way and a

The right way would have been to hand --

to have two copies, to hand a copy to the witness, to read the
question and read the answer. And then I figure out whether
that's proper impeachment or not.
The second is, once she discerned that it was not
really impeachable is to not simply withdraw it, but to admit
the error.

Because this witness is entitled to some integrity.

And otherwise to leave the witness with the notion that he has
somehow perjured himself in front of the jury is really an
unfairness to the witness. And -MR. TAN:

And --

THE COURT:

So either of those would have been

satisfactory.
MR. TAN:

And I totally understand that, your Honor.

And I can speak on Ms. Shreve's behalf that that was not at all
her intention to do that. As an officer of the Court, I think
to put it mildly she was rather rattled.
THE COURT:

Water under the bridge.

appeared in front of me thousands of times.

Ms. Shreve has

This in no way,

shape, or form affects my opinion of Ms. Shreve.
that we do.

This is stuff

When I took the bench I promised I would never

forget what it was like to practice a lawyer.

I remember

things like this happen, no big deal, but I thought I'd use
this as a learning experience so that Ms. Shreve would
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understand the proper way to do the impeachment, or when
something improper happens to admit it.

Because the problem is

without admitting there was an error, the jury was still left
with the potential impression that this witness had prejudiced
himself on her own. And that was simply unfair.

That would be

unfair to the witness.
There's Ms. Shreve.

Why don't you take -- both take

five minutes to speak to Ms. Shreve.
MS. SHREVE:

I apologize, your Honor.

THE COURT:

That's okay, Ms. Shreve. No problem.

Why don't you all take five minutes and we'll come
back in.

Okay.
(Recess taken by the court.)
THE COURT:

All right.

Let's go back on the record.

You've had a chance to digest what I've said.
Ms. Johnson, I'd like to start with you and wonder
what your thoughts are.
MS. JOHNSON:

Your Honor, in speaking with Ms. Shreve

and Mr. Tan, it's my impression that at this point they are
both going to be representing him with the integrity of court
officers and do their job like they should.
I have also talked with them about some safety
measures that we could take to perhaps help alleviate any
concerns they might have.

I offered them different scenarios

of what we could do to accomplish that, and I left it up to
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1

them as to whether or not they -- what they thought of those

2

ideas.

3

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Tan, Ms. Shreve, I'd like

4

to hear from you about your thoughts.

5

MR. TAN:

6

Your Honor, if we may approach the bench

first.

7

THE COURT:

You may.

8 I

(Discussion held at sidebar off the record.)

9

THE COURT:

10

leave the record on.

I'll see counsel in chambers.

11

(In chambers.)

12

THE COURT:

Please

Sorry to start your morning with this.

13

There's actually -- first thing (inaudible) I want to tell you

14

there's a right way and a wrong way to do an impeachment.

15

must really be willing to take the document up to the

16

individual, all right, give them the paper in front of them,

17

you ask the question, and the answer, (inaudible).

18

You

And the second is I just simply said that you have

19

made an error, so that left the impression that you've actually

20

been impeached.

21

fact that that happened.

I would not have admonished you if it was the
Okay?

22 j

MS. SHREVE: Okay.

23

THE COURT:

So in the future either of those would

24

not drop (inaudible) or the former is preferred, but you have

25

nothing to worry about.
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MS. SHREVE: Yeah -THE COURT:

I have a great deal of respect for you.

MS. SHREVE:

I would be disappointed if you didn't

call me on it. So I'm absolutely -- yeah.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. TAN:
issues.

Mr. Tan.

Your Honor, I'm somewhat -- I have three

On the one hand I have to continue to zealously

represent our defendant. And because of that I can't disclose
certain information.
THE COURT: Nor, do I want you to.

I will tell you,

though, when we he comes out, we will have to put on the record
that counsel have disclosed that they felt intimidated, felt
intimidated by him.

That may be or may not be a breach, but

that has to happen.

'• • . ,

MR. TAN: Thank you.

Also the second issue, the

second issue, the second (inaudible) I have is (inaudible)
certain deeds to and obligations to the court.

But I think the

third is really important issue I think personally, a n d I think
Charity might take a different position, b u t m y third issue at
this point is (inaudible) it's the well -- the wellbeing of m y
client.
THE COURT:
M S . SHREVE:

He's worried about y o u .
We're worried.

State is going to help m e out.

I'm okay.

Let's go. T h e

We'll b e fine.

(Back in open court.)
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THE BAILIFF:

Remain seated.

Court's again in

session.
THE COURT: All right.

I just want to reiterate,

though, that there are certain disclosures that will have to be
placed on the record with the Defendant.
Do you want to step out for a minute, Ms. Johnson?
MS. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Bring out the Defendant, please.

Good morning, sir.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Good morning.

Let's reflect on the record the Defendant

is now present.
Let's talk a little bit about yesterday so that you
understand where I'm coming from.
I went back and listened to that tape and then
listened again.
MS. SHREVE:
THE COURT:

Judge, we don't have the State here.
It makes it easier that way.

for the State, please.

Let's wait

You may be seated.

All right, the State is here.
Mr. Martinez, I never want you to think that I treat
your concerns lightly.

Sir, what I did is went back and

listened to that tape and reviewed that transcript several
times.

And I have to say that in my opinion you're just wrong.

That the question was:

Isn't it true that you had dozens of
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conversations with the individual?

And what the question and

answer was is, no, he had been in there dozens of times. So
very different.

All right?

But I wanted you to know I didn't stop them.
was my recollection.

That

That's why I did admonish them but just

to make sure I'm wrong, because it wouldn't be the first time
I'm wrong, I went back and listened to that tape several times.
And if I was wrong, Mr. Martinez, I want you to understand that
it's my philosophy that if you are going to eat crow, eat it
while it's young.

Okay?

So but there wasn't in my opinion an

error there.
That having been said, I don't believe that your
behavior was appropriate.

And I hope you won't do that. I

hope that you will agree with me that I've treated you with
respect throughout these proceedings, from beginning to end.
And that is always my -- that is always my goal.
If you believe that I haven't, if you believe that
I've done anything wrong, I encourage you, I encourage
everybody to file every appropriate paperwork with it. I'm
happy to have my conduct constantly surveyed.
do a better job.
±nc

It just makes me

That's first.

Dcuuiia

xo

J_ • v c

jjcai
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they feel intimidated by you, whether rightfully or wrongfully
they feel intimidated in a way and have disclosed that
intimidation and that has perhaps caused them to do things that
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1

they would not otherwise do as officers of the Court.

2

thinking of yesterday's inpeachment, for example, Ms. Shreve.

3

I don't know if that's a fair example or not.

4

appropriate disclosure to place on the record.

But that is an

5

We're going to go forward with this trial.

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

your Honor.

Okay?

Well, I agree with what you said,

I was wrong about what she had asked you.

8 J gave her was a piece of paper that (inaudible.)
9

I'm

And she asked

if there was any questions that I wanted to ask Jose.

10

quite a few things in this.

11

I went over again.

12

things that are in green.

13

defend -- then right here it says APT.

What I

There's

I went over it again last night.

And the things that are in yellow, there's
And her being a lawyer help
That says appointed

14 .attorney -15 I

THE COURT: Yes.

16

THE DEFENDANT:

-- part of No. 2.

So that there are

17

different abbreviations on here that says Judge, and it says

18

witness.

19

questions that have been asked through the witness, Jose

20

Jimenez, and there are statements he had made regarding --

21

No. 3, witness, you know, APT No. 2.

THE COURT:

So there's

But you think that they are inconsistent.

22 j I can't pass on those because that wasn't the question that was
23

given to me.

I can only pass on the one. And like I said, I

24

called it the way I saw it. But because I take everybody's

25

concerns seriously, not just yours, but everybody's, I pulled
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that transcript two or three times.

I listened to the tape and

went back and forth to make sure.
Now the other thing is if you believe at the end of
the day that you haven't been effectively represented, that
there's a problem, you have -- you know, people frequently
bring before me or before the appellate courts, motions for the
ineffective assistance of counsel. And this might be the kind
of stuff that you do where you say, listen, these are the kinds
of questions that I had asked, these are the kind of questions
I wanted asked and what have you, and those get evaluated.
Okay?
I'm not taking your concerns lightly.
taken your concerns lightly.
is to you.

I never have

I understand how important this

And that's why -- even for example, I'm careful to

explain why if I joke with the jurors when we're picking them,
it's just so that we get better answers from them and more
honest from them.

Okay?

THE DEFENDANT:

Well, I'm already going to fill out a

motion to -- file for a new counsel based on integrity of
counsel (inaudible.)
THE COURT:

I did after we talked about it for a

while because I didn't .think that there was a basis for it at
the time.
THE DEFENDANT:

There are issues now today.

You

know, I was told by Mr. Patrick that when we first started this
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case, looking into this case, he had represented me, he told
me, I asked him, so how are we doing?

Are we globalizing all

these together or are we fighting them one at a time?
Martinez, how do you want to do it?
think we should do it?

He goes,

I said, well, how do you

What -- what, you know --he goes we're

going to fight it one at a time, the big one. And then he goes
that's the big thing he told me.

He goes -- I go what's that?

He goes, the five to life, attempted aggravated attempted
murder because that's the one we're going to focus on.

So he

came here today, from my knowledge, prepared to fight the
attempted aggravated murder.
THE COURT:

Could I stop you for just one second only

because you are starting to invade the attorney/client
privilege and tell me things that are privileged and that
nobody ever has a right to know, and that you ought to be
careful about that?

If there's a conflict, if at the end of

the day there is a conflict, you are going to get another
lawyer that you can disclose all this to and can decide what to
disclose and what not to disclose.

You can tell me if you want

to.

But you should know that

It's your privilege to waive.

you have that right.

Okay?

Now you are right to say that you brought this motionin front of me and that I've denied it. You know, I don't know
if you recall, we had a hearing.

We had a hearing for quite a

while and at the end of the day, this is what I told you.
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Everybody is entitled to be represented by a lawyer under the
constitution of the United States and in Utah.
particularly in this courtroom.

And

I'11 guarantee that right

without a question.
But what you are not entitled to is if you can't
afford a lawyer is a lawyer of your choosing.

In order to do

that you have to establish that there's good cause for that
breakdown.
And at the time when I denied that motion,
Mr. Martinez, in my view and maybe I'm wrong and will be
reversed on that, it won't be the first time I'm reversed and
it won't be the last time I'm reversed.
call it like I see it.

That's okay.

I just

So but that's where it ends up.

But right now you're in the middle of trial and it's
not possible to just bring in two new lawyers in the middle of
a trial.

It may be that you use it as an argument for some

appeal or ineffective assistance or whatever you want to call
it, right, Mr. Tan?

And new lawyers would be assigned that.

Am I right about that?

If there's a conflict which

alleges deficient performance in any way, it would be perceived
as a conflict.

Your office will conflict that out and new

MR. TAN:

That is correct, your Honor.

Our office

policy would be that if there is a conflict, it -- I guess I
should qualify it, there's a legitimate conflict even to a
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point if it's just a personality conflict where the client and
the attorney just cannot be able to get along, then the office
would have a policy of conflicting the case to another legal
defender.

That was always the first preference.

The

alternative would be if that doesn't take care of the
situation, the last resort would be to conflict the case
outside of the office.
And also just for the benefit of the record, in
regards to what Mr. Martinez indicated about the conversation
that I had with him, just so that the record is clear, should
we need to refer to it in the future, I did not in any way
refer to any of the statements that he made.

That -- I think I

never referred to it as counsel's (inaudible).

What I did, in

fact, inform Mr. Martinez is that Ms. Shreve and I are working
on a motion to try to sever Count I from Count II.
THE COURT:

From the most significant -- sever the

attempted murder from the other?
MR. TAN:

That's correct, but I did not promise --

THE COURT:

We don't need to go into that.

It may or

may not be the basis for an appropriate motion in the future
where there's new counsel.
And Mr. Martinez, vou wouldp'fc "^ t-n^ f-iror
give you an example.

THI

I tried a very high profile murder case

not too long ago, you might recall, where the husband was
alleged to have run down his wife, to have directed the white
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In very similar

circumstances he was upset with counsel and new counsel came in
and they brought before me the new trial motion and it was all
There!s a process to work through.

evaluated.

I know for both victims, this has got to be
incredibly frustrating because I know victims feel that at this
point in the proceeding the criminal defendants get every
right.

I know from the criminal defendant's perspective this

has to be very frustrating because you feel like, you know, you
are getting railroaded at every turn.

All I want to tell you

is I'm doing the best I can with it, I'm going to continue to
treat you with respect, and I hope you will afford me the
courtesy of doing the same back and that we won't have that
kind of interchange that we had yesterday.
Okay?
THE DEFENDANT:

I don't agree with what you are

doing.
THE COURT:
I am doing.

I respect that you do not agree with what

I'll even acknowledge that I may make mistakes.

All I'm telling you is I'm doing what I think is correct under
the law.

Okay?
All right.

So I believe we're at the point of

calling our next witness.
Having said you don't agree with what I am doing, I
guess I would back up a question and say, what is it that you
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21

1

want me to do?

2

THE DEFENDANT:

Well, it's like the lady comes in

3

here that works here.

She comes in here and tells Patrick out

4

there, there's two officers that are out there sitting there

5

talking about the case with another female out there.

6

all -- they work here how many years, 14 years and attended how

7

many trials?

8

about the trial or anything concerning this case out there in

9

the hallways. And none of that is brought to his attention.

They

They know they are not supposed to be talking

10

He was brought up on the stand.

11

THE COURT:

Mr. Tan didn't even asked him.

That's not actually true.

Right?

12

Ms. Richards was brought in in front of me and questioned.

13

I try to figure out at what level it happens.

And

Is it a high

14 I level that is going to require sanctions and it's going to
15 I involve me imposing contempt sanctions or referring them to the
16

bar, or is it a low level?

17

got to kind of -- your counsel immediately brought it to my

18

attention.

19

in and was questioned.

20

agree with what I'm doing, but you are not telling me what it

21

is you are asking me to do.

22 |
23

I mean you got to do triage. You

That other lawyer waited, right?

THE DEFENDANT:

That person came

So they're -- again, you say you don't

I already asked you I need new

counsel, ineffective counsel.

24

THE COURT:

You did --

25

THE DEFENDANT:

Other than that --
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THE COURT:

Yes, I did.

THE DEFENDANT:
trial.

I have a right, you know, to a fair

And I don't believe I'm being represented to the

fullest like they say -- like to be represented.

So I have,

you know, problem in (inaudible.)
THE COURT:

You filed a new motion.

for new/counsel which was denied.

Filed a motion

Are you looking for new

counsel now?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

And what would the basis be?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Ineffective counsel.

Well, based upon what?

.. THE DEFENDANT:

My lawyers, they feel intimidated by

me, so, therefore, we have a conflict of interest.

So

therefore, they feel they are afraid of me or whatever their
'complaints would be.

So, therefore, there's a conflict between

me and the lawyers.

So, therefore, I don't see how we can, you

know, communicate without me feeling that there's a fear
between me and them.
THE COURT:

Mr. Tan, do you believe that you can

vigorously represent this Defendant?

THE COURT:

Do you feel you can vigorously represent

this Defendant?
MR. TAN:

Yes, your Honor, I can.
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THE COURT:

Thank you.

Where's Ms. Shreve?

Are your concerns such -- I mean, Mr. Tan, you're a
public defender.

You have to run into situations where you are

confronted with people that intimidate you.
that you have.

I'm not suggesting

I don't want to get you (inaudible) -- but have

people actually intimidated you or tried to intimidate you,
whatever, have you been able to zealously advocate for them?
MR. TAN:

Yes, I have, your Honor.

THE COURT: And is any of this going to affect your
ability to act as a zealous advocate?
MR. TAN:

No, your Honor, I'm still ready to go

forward.
THE COURT:

Ms. Shreve, are you able to act as a

zealous advocate of this matter?
MS. SHREVE:
THE COURT:

I am, your Honor.

Absolutely.

I know that they've indicated that they

have felt intimidated by some of that, but I also don't know -if that's a result -- one, if it's a result of your own
conduct, I don't think that you get to recreate the situation
in which you get new counsel by doing that.
Two, if it's just a misperception, I don't have the
sense from counsel that they are not capable of fully
performing.
Do you have any specifics for me?

Other than what

we've talked about.
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THE DEFENDANT:

Yeah, I have specifics.

I brought

the conduct to your attention for --of conflict of interest
and ineffective counsel.

I talked to Charity and got Mr. Tan's

attention about filing a motion to suppress evidence on Officer
McPhie and another officer, I forgot his name, that they had
illegally obtained statements from my father -THE COURT:

We've talked about this.

THE DEFENDANT:

Well, you just asked me if I had

any -- you know you just asked me -THE COURT:

I'm sorry.

I asked a bad question.

Anything different than when we've talked about it?
THE DEFENDANT:
I just told you.

Yeah, there is something different.

There's another thing what he told me we were

going to be fighting one case at a time, not globalizing.

So

from my knowledge and what I know, Mr. Tan and Charity, they
came here to prepare to fight an attempted aggravated murder,
not the robbery.

We was totally being -- I was told we were

fighting one case at a time. And we come here.

Yesterday we

start trial and it's all brought in all together.
THE COURT:
not up to them.

Well, they did move -- first of all, it's

It's up to me. And they did move to sever

those counts and argue that they be severed.
part of the motion was granted.

And, in fact,

Any of the threats that were

made or the nonpayment or what have you, threats is the wrong
word, but any of the nonpayments involving the first stop, I
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threw all of those out based on the arguments of your counsel.
And, in fact, that's why Ms. Johnson had to dance around those
questions with the witness.
second part.

I denied it with respect to the

So the motion was granted in part and denied in

part.
THE DEFENDANT:
about it?

When did I come to court to hear

I was never hear to hear nothing about that motion

being filed.

He just told me yesterday.

And I asked him, I

wrote him a list to (inaudible) I asked him.

I wrote it down

on there, why are all these being brought together when you
told me one we would fight them one at a time?

He goes, oh,

there's a new law that just came in the other day and we'll be
able to file a motion on that.
THE COURT:

You know, I'll look at the record, but

I'll virtually guarantee he was present during argument, wasn't
he?
MR. TAN:

Your Honor, I know vividly that he was

because five minutes later Ms. Shreve asked to switch seats
with him.
THE COURT:

That he was present at the time that we

argaed the motion to sever?

Any question about it?

MS. SHREVE: No.
THE COURT: All right.
Mr. Lopez, you were here.

Stop pulling my leg then

What am I saying, Mr. Lopez -- I'm

sorry, Mr. Martinez, you were present at the time it was
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argued.
You know, every time you say something like that —
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
different story.

I don't recall it.

You don't recall -- well, that's a

Let's go forward.

THE DEFENDANT:

I'll agree to go forward with this

counsel.
THE COURT:
is denied.

I'm not giving you a choice.

Your motion

You have the right at the end --

THE DEFENDANT:

So you are violating my

constitutional rights -THE COURT:

I don't, I don't believe --

THE DEFENDANT: '---"to a fair trial.
THE COURT:

I don't believe that I am.

And the other

thing I'm trying to tell you is that you have not only appeal
rights but rights to ask for a new trial.

We finish the trial.

If you believe that things are done inappropriately, including
all these things that you've alleged, you have the right to
come back and ask for a new trial, and people have done that.
You are being very difficult, Mr. Martinez.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

It's my life that's on the line, '

I'm not telling you that it's not.

I'm

telling you that I've tried -- you know, there are a couple of
hundred jury cases, and I'm telling you that you are being as
difficult a defendant as any I have encountered in the couple
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hundred jury cases that I have dealt with.
Are you trying to stare me down, Mr. Martinez?

For

the record, are you trying to stare me down?
THE DEFENDANT:

I was looking at you while you are

talking.
THE COURT: Are you trying to stare me down,
Mr. Martinez?
THE DEFENDANT:
talking.

That's all.
THE COURT:

going on?

I'm just looking at you while you are

(Inaudible.)
How about in the back?

Is that what's

Sir?
UNKNOWN SPEAKER:

Grinning.

THE COURT: Yes.
UNKNOWN SPEAKER:

I'm not.

THE COURT: All right.
Are we ready to go forward?
MS. JOHNSON:
MR. TAN:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:
thank you.

The State is, your Honor.

Call your next witness but don't -- yes,

Don't you think we ought to have a jury first?

MS. JOHNSON:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.
Sorry sir.
MS. JOHNSON:

I apologize to you in the back.
And your Honor, based on that previous

conversation, I may have to take a phone call.

So if I leave,
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I apologize to the Court.
THE COURT:

I had told -- I don't know if you heard

me, I told Ms. Shreve and Mr. Tan earlier, the two of you ought
to feel free to come and go.

The fact you like, so you don't

feel like you are disrespecting the jury, I'm going to let them
know you have witnesses out in the hallway, what have you, and
at times it's necessary for counsel to get up and walk outside.
And that they are not trying to be rude, but rather than
interrupt the proceedings, we'll just have you come and go as
necessary.
All rise.

You may be seated.

Good morning everybody.
Ready to go?

Get a good night's sleep?

I got some yes, some no.

That's a good answer.

We're ready to get proceeded with day two of the trial in this
matter.
I've been off coffee for a week, so I haven't been
able to speak very well.
Call your next witness please -- one minute.
It occurred to me yesterday that there are times when
the lawyers have gotten up and left the jury room -- or the
courtroom.

I want you to understand that there are witnesses

that are in the hallway that we keep out there so they don't
hear other witness's testimony.

And at times it may be

necessary for a lawyer to get up and go outside to do whatever
they have to do.

I' ve asked them not to interrupt the
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every opportunity to ask for it for a curative instruction.
You said no.

I asked you if you wanted me to bring them back

and talk to them at length about anything else.
MR. TAN:

You said no.

The concern would be, your Honor, it was --

THE COURT:
MR. TAN:

Go ahead.

The concern would be, your Honor, it really

does put us in a tough position because it's a catch-22. We
focus on it, I think it would draw negative attention.

If we

don't -THE COURT:
MR. TAN:

Denied.

Your Honor, the final thing would be then

whether the Defendant Julio Martinez will be taking the stand
or not.

I had a chance to talk to Mr. Martinez in the holding

cell and I indicated to him both that he has the right to take
the stand today and testify, and at the same time I also
indicated to him that he has the right not to take the stand
and incriminate himself.
He asked for my opinion, and I indicated to
Mr. Martinez what my opinion is. Without disclosing any trial
strategy at this point, it's my understanding that Mr. Martinez
will not be taking the stand.
THE COURT:

Mr. Martinez, you have an absolute

privilege to take the stand.

And I would instruct the jury

that just because you've been charged with the crime is no
reason for treating your testimony any differently than any
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other witness.
Alternative, you absolutely have a privilege not to
testify or say anything that may tend to incriminate you. And
I will instruct the jury that they are to draw no adverse
inference from the fact that you did not testify.
understand that?

Do you

Do you understand what I just said?

MR. TAN:

Can you answer the Judge?

THE COURT:

Yes. All right.

Do'y° u have any

questions for me?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT:

Is it your intent not to testify?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Do you intend to call any
witnesses?
MR. TAN:

Your Honor, we'd like to.briefly recall

Gabriel Martinez.
THE COURT: All right. Bring in the jurors.
Now are you thinking clearly, Mr. Martinez, today?
Have you consumed any alcohol or illicit substances that may
affect your judgment?
THE DEFENDANT:

Not today, no.

THE COURT: Not that you know of?
THE DEFENDANT:

I said not today, no.

THE COURT: Not today?
THE DEFENDANT:

Recently?

No. Not even yesterday, no.
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THE COURT:
today?

You feel like you are thinking clearly

Do you suffer from any condition for which you receive

treatment, physical, mental, or emotional condition?
need to answer out loud for me.
THE DEFENDANT:

No?

You

I'm sorry.

Right now?

Are you talking about

present, like right now?
THE COURT:

Yeah, do you suffer from anything,

physical, mental or emotional?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Have you been prescribed any

medications you are not taking?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: All right.
thinking clearly?

So you feel like you are

You've had a chance to talk to counsel?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Martinez, what's the highest

level of education that you've had?
THE DEFENDANT:

Eleventh grade.

THE COURT: And you clearly read, speak and write
English?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And understand it?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:

Okay.

(Jury enters the courtroom.)
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MR. FERBRACHE:
THE COURT:
MR. TAN:

No, your Honor.

May this witness be released?

Yes, your Honor.

MR. FERBRACHE:
THE COURT:

I have no objection to that.

You are free to go young man.

Thank you

very much.
I'm going to excuse you members of the jury one more
time.

Out you go.

Remember what I told you.

Don't talk about

the case with anyone including each other until it is submitted
to you for your deliberations.
(Jury exits the courtroom.)
THE COURT:

You may be seated.

Mr. Martinez, I wanted to give you one more
opportunity to make the decision of whether or not to testify.
Mr. Martinez, I want to give you one more opportunity
to make a decision about whether to testify or not to testify.
You've indicated that no one is forcing you not to testify.

Is

that correct?
THE DEFENDANT:

Nobody is forcing me.

THE COURT: Are you making the decision not to
testify of your own volition?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, I am making that decision.

Of your own free will?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:

Would you like any more time to speak to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

GABRIEL MARTINEZ - Direct by MR. TAN

235

1

your lawyers about i t ?

2

THE DEFENDANT: No.

3

THE COURT:

4

with anyone about it?

5

about it?

6
7

Would you like the evening to think

MS. JOHNSON:

Your Honor, if the record would reflect

he shook his head no.

8
9

Would you like any more time to speak

THE COURT:

Thank you.

The record should reflect

that he's indicating in the negative to all of these.

10

All right. And as I said before, you have an

11

absolute right to testify.

And if you did, I would carefully

12

instruct the jury that they are to draw no adverse that is --

13

strike that.

14

to be treated as anybody else's. And just because you are

I would tell them that your testimony is entitled

15 I accused of a crime is no reason for rejecting your testimony.
16

Do you understand that?

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

Yes, I do.

Do you understand that you also have this

19

absolute privilege under our constitution not to testify, and

20

that if you elect not to testify, I will inform the jury that

21

they are to draw no adverse, that is no negative inference from

22

the fact that you did not testify?

23

you?

24

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

25

THE COURT:

Does that make sense to

Do you have any questions for me about
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your right to testify?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT:

Do you believe that up made a fully

informed decision?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And you are electing not to?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT:

You intend to call any more witnesses?

MS. SHREVE: No.
MR. TAN:

No, your Honor.

THE COURT:
point in time.

I'm going to bring the jurors in at this

I'm going to indicate that the State -- I mean

the defense has rested.
Does the State have any rebuttal?
MS. JOHNSON:
•THE COURT:

No, your Honor.

Then I'm going to indicate to them that

the evidence portion is closed.

I'm going to release them for

the evening, bring them back at 9:00 o'clock.

Bring you back

at 8:00 o'clock.
I have a brief telephone conference at nine, another
one of those ten second things, but between eight -- actually
let's say 8:30, between 8:30 and 9:00 o'clock we'll hammer out
the jury instructions.
MS. JOHNSON:

Is that okay?
Well, your Honor, I was -- frankly I

was thinking the only hard thing is reading the instructions
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And as I've indicated several times already, the
State believes that the evidence supports the findings I ask of
you.

7-Eleven surveillance video, the 911 recording, the

testimony from all of the witnesses, the wounds, they all
support only one conclusion, and that's guilty, guilty of
attempted homicide.

And the evidence supports guilty of

robbery, guilty of domestic violence in the presence of
children, Gabe and Isaiah, and interference with an arrest.
Mr. Tan will have the opportunity to speak with you,
and after he does, I will again briefly speak about the intent
in this case.
MR. TAN:

Your Honor, if I may have just a few

minutes to set some things up.
THE COURT:
MR. TAN:

You may, of course.

If I may proceed, your Honor?

THE COURT:

You may.
CLOSING ARGUMENT

BY MR.TAN:
Good morning, members of the jury.

On behalf of

Julio Martinez, Ms. Shreve, I want to thank you for taking your
time out of your schedule for two days, going into the third
dav where I'm sure I can describe maybe some of the thoughts
that you are having in the last few days.
of testimony from witnesses.
presented.

You've heard a lot

You have seen a lot of evidence

I think it's safe to say that it's been a shocking
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experience, probably weren't anticipating if you were called
for jury duty that you'd be listening to a case where it's as
bloody as what you've heard in the last two days.

It's a

shocking experience and I know doubt can assume that it was
also a very emotional day, emotional two days for some of you.
And I think, finally, probably been exhausting an experience
for all of us.
I also notice that as some of you were listening to
testimony of the evidence, you took some notes.
good.

To me that's

The judge read you some instructions on note taking.

I

know that I can't cover everything in the last two days within
the last --or within half an hour.
as well can't cover everything.

I know the State probably

So I would invite you as you

deliberate to talk about the case, the evidence, the testimony
and deliberate using some of the notes that you took.
I want to first of all talk about Teresa, Teresa
Martinez and the evidence that you've heard, the 911 call.
Are you able to play that again?
MS. JOHNSON:
MR. TAN:

If you have the exhibit.

That's fine.

not play the 911 call.

I would prefer that we rather

It is what it is. There is no need to

add insult to Teresa's injuries.
In the 911 tape as you recall on Monday, you heard a
very emotional Teresa Martinez.

She was crying, she was in a

lot of pain, she was screaming, she was yelling for help.
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Frankly, she is entitled to all those emotions because of what
happened.

It shouldn't have happened.

about that.

There's no dispute

To play the 911 tape again, I think, is just going

to add insult to the obvious and interest.
We also have, and you will be taking this back with
you as you deliberate, a lot of photographs.

I'm not going to

go over all these exhibits because, once again, I think they
speak for themself.

Going from top to bottom with these

photographs, as Teresa indicated as she testified, she has
scratches on the head.

Also, from Teresa's testimony and also

Dr. Duffy's testimony, she also had injuries to her left arm I
believe and also her left leg, her arm and leg also.

You'll

see it in the photographs.
There's also been testimony about how many times this
may have happened.

It's obvious, it's undisputed that this was

not a one-time stabbing, that she didn't just get stabbed once
nor twice.

Dr. Duffy testified when he evaluated her at the

emergency room, he noted that there were seven injuries.
There's also been testimony from other witnesses as
to eight stab wounds, nine.

I think someone mentioned 15.

Teresa testified it felt like 20. But we can only imagine
whether it be nine or 20, the seconds between each of the
stabbings probably felt like an eternity.
There's also been some statements that the State
pointed out that Mr. Martinez may have made.

I think most of
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1

these statements came from Gabriel Martinez, who I agree,

2

shouldn't have had to take the stand to testify, at a young

3

age, having to do that, having to be an adult, take over a

4

situation that should never happened to him.

5

I'm sure that Gabriel Martinez did hear some

6

statements that his father made as this unfortunate event

7

happened.

8

of Teresa Martinez.

9

my brother.

It may be this is what I am going to do to in terms
It may be I'm going to kill you for F'ing

I'm sure there were statements that Gabriel heard.

10

We don't know for sure how accurate some of these statements

11

may be.

12

testimony.

13

child.

14

2009.

15

I'm not going to nitpick the words to Gabriel's
It was a very traumatic experience for this young

And he's trying his best to recall that day, May 5th,
It's not easy for him, I'm sure.
The testimony from Gabriel about after the stabbing,

16

his father went to 7-Eleven, saw his father at 7-Eleven, we

17

know that that probably is not fully accurate.

18

that information elsewhere because as the officers testified

19

the house was not exactly next to 7-Eleven.

20

look out the window, see his dad going to the 7-Eleven parking

21

lot.

22

what we render.

23

some statements that way.

It was a little bit away.

He rray have got

It was nothing to

But for a young child that is

And like I said, there's no doubt he remembers

24

People make bad decisions.

25

their emotions get the best of them.

Sometimes they'll let
And because of those bad
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decisions and emotions, sometimes we regret, we feel sorry.

If

life was easy, if life was like a VCR, a C D . player, go back
and change things, rewind things, I'm sure we would.
I will tell you right now that Julio Martinez made
some bad decisions.

We have heard those bad decisions.

went to the bar and drank.

He

He had a Tequila bottle that Teresa

testified was not hers found at the crime scene, it was empty.
You can assume why it was empty and he had consumed Tequila.
We know that based on the alcohol from the bar, the
alcohol from the Tequila bottle, and that was Teresa's own
statements when she testified in regards to when Julio came
over and then she talked a little bit about him going to the
bar.

And one of the questions asked and her answer was

something in the nature of, well, he wanted to stay over, sleep
over.

I allowed it because I didn't think it was a good idea

for him to drive.
That was the mental condition of Julio.
drunk.

He was intoxicated.

He was

He was probably so intoxicated and

we even heard Jose Jimenez indicate, yeah, he appeared drunk to
me.

There's no dispute about that.

He was probably so

intoxicated, he probably didn't know what he intended to do the
next minute, maybe even the next second.
And, of course, emotions.

It's always a bad

combination when you consume alcohol and it doesn't do good
things for you.

There are happy drunks, I guess, and there's
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some angry drunks.

Emotions.

Julio also let his emotions get

the best of him.
I think that's the testimony about the marriage going
bad and the process of possibly divorcing, separating Teresa
and the kid that sometimes she'd go for months without talking
to Julio, sometimes for days without talking to him.

And you

know that this is not a happy marriage, which is unfortunate.
We also know from some testimony that he was having
some feelings again about the death of one of his siblings, his
brother.

So yes, there's a lot of things going on inside of

Julio.
I want to now shift gears and talk about jury
instructions.

I believe the jury instructions -- I'm going to

kind of go backwards here.
easier.

For my purposes I think it will be

<:.., ..
I want to refer to Jury Instruction No. 47,

interference with an arresting officer.
us some time.

I want to save all of

I would save Mr. Ferbrache some time. No. 5,

interference of a police officer.

He's guilty.

You can check

that off.
Going backwards, Jury Instructions No. 44 and 43,
which are pretty identical except for the name Gabriel Martinez
and Isaiah Martinez.
not an.issue.

I list three and four on the chart.

Julio Martinez is guilty of that as well.

It's
Just

save sometime.
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I do want to find out, however, in referring to
Instructions No. 43 and 44. Element No. 2, that the Defendant
committed domestic violence, attempted criminal homicide, or
intentionally caused serious bodily injury for use of a
dangerous weapon against (inaudible.)

I'm going to submit to

you on guilty three and four based on intentionally causing
serious bodily, bodily injury or use a dangerous weapon against
a co-habitant.

I will come back to the other possibility,

committed domestic violence, attempted criminal homicide.
Now I want to go to Instruction No. 41.
robbery.

It's the

As the State indicated this is in reference to some

gas at 7-Eleven.

We've heard testimony from Jose Jimenez that

indicated that Julio didn't have permission to take the gas.
Julio was trying to do it illegal, by force.
At the same time there are jury instructions that
will defer to the credibility of a witness.

I'm not trying to

single out Jose Jimenez, but one thing that stands out about
Jose as we were comparing the case, compared to other
witnesses, is that Jose Jimenez does have a criminal history,
felony.

He was on probation at the time.

officer.

That job was important to him.

He had a probation

Ms. Shreve asked Jose Jimenez in regards to his job
when you follow all the rules, all the policies of 7-Eleven,
you don't get in trouble, you lose your job, and you lose your
job, you get in trouble.

The question then becomes, and I
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would invite you to deliberate and talk amongst yourselves, did
Jose Jimenez have some type of motivation to testify what he
did.

Did he have a dog in a fight?
That leaves us with what I left blank.

I left this

one because this is one decision, an important decision where I
ask each of you to think about what should No. 1 be?

Now, I

will tell you right now, there's no dispute in regard to what
happened.

Julio stabbed Teresa multiple times.

The question

then becomes is he guilty -- (inaudible) is he guilty of
attempted criminal homicide, is one of the options; or is he
guilty of domestic violence and aggravated assault that causes
serious bodily injury, option No. 2; or 3, is he guilty of
aggravated assault using a dangerous weapon?

There's option

No. 4 on the road map as you would call it, Instruction No. 34
is a road map.

There's also then the fourth possibility which

would be you find Julio Martinez not guilty to Count No. I.
It's not going to happen.
So each of you will be making just one decision as I
indicated, but a very important decision.

And as my colleague,

Ms. Shreve indicated in her opening statement back early Monday
morning we ask that you keep an open mind and I hope you have
as you absorbed all of the testimony and the evidence.

We also

ask and continue to ask that you set aside your emotions
because some of the testimony is hard to take.

We're all human

beings, we have feelings, we have emotions, but we ask you try
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to be, try to set aside some of those emotions.
What we do ask from you is the jury instructions,
read them, discuss them amongst yourselves, their explanations
of various terms to help you guide, to help guide you as far as
you make that decision.

So in essence we ask that you try to

set aside your emotions as hard as that might be, just follow
what is on the jury instructions, what the judge has read to
you.
I'm not going to harp too much on some of the legal
terms.

I want to first of all talk about the burden of proof.

I think that's as the State indicated the burden of proof is on
the State.

I think the State also indicated that they are

excited and thrilled that that burden is on them.
good.

They feel

They feel they have a strong case.
It is the law that the burden of proof is on the

State.' They must prove to you, each of you beyond a reasonable
doubt about what happened.
And Mr. Ferbrache was quite confident about that
burden of proof.

He thinks each of you will come back and find

Julio Martinez guilty of attempted criminal homicide.
Representing the State, Mr. Ferbrache has a zealous
duty to do the job.

At the same time we have a duty to present

to you alternatives on the other side of what happened.
There's always two sides of every story.
There's a possibility, and that's the question for
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1

you, that's why we have a road map, Instruction No. 34, did the

2

State overcharge Julio Martinez?

3

included options?

4

possibility that maybe overzealousness, overcharging.

5

happen?

6

deliberate.

7

Why do we have lesser

It wouldn't be in there if it wasn't for the
Did that

That's one question I would ask you take when you

This is my last opportunity to talk to you.

I'm

8

going to sit back down when I am done and then the State will

9

come back and they get to do what's called rebuttal.

In other

10

words, putting it plainly, because the burden of proof is on

11

the State, they get the last word.

12

And I think the focus then, I'm not going to speak on

13

their behalf, I think the focus of their rebuttal will be then

14

on whether it is an attempted homicide.

There's no need to

15 I talk about three, four or five.
16

Attempted criminal homicide, when you think about it

17 } what comes to mind?

Think of criminal homicide.

I have a

18

loaded gun, I know it's late, I'm not happy with someone, I

19

point the gun at them, shoot them.

20

easily of killing someone.

21

the vital area of your body.

22

attempted criminal homicide.

23

I know this gun is capable

I've fired a gun, shot the person,
They survive, they are paralyzed,

A knife, let's use another example, another deadly

24

weapon, a knife.

I have a knife.

I'm not happy with someone.

25

And I go stab them on the chest in a critical area.
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Some of

this came out from the testimony of Dr. Duffy, vital areas,
given chances to kill.

Once again, they survived, that's

attempted criminal homicide.
The question then is did Julio do what he did with a
pair of scissors, granted stabbing Teresa multiple times?
making some statements, this is what you get.
scratches on her head.

Even

There were

She had some wounds on her left arm.

She had "wounds on her left leg.

Is that what you think of when

you think of attempted criminal homicide, or is it a
possibility of an aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon?
I'm going to get to that jury instruction in a few minutes.
I also want to mention that I will be referring to
Dr. Duffy's testimony and his notes as well.
But let's go and talk about Jury Instruction No. 45.
There are two parts to this jury instruction, just like all the
other jury instructions.
the act itself.

You have to have a mental intent and

So before you can find Julio Martinez guilty

of Instruction No. 35, attempted criminal homicide, the law is
you must be satisfied, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that
not only was the act there, but also the intent.
I think when the State comes back and talk about
during their rebuttal, I think the focus will be on intent.

I

want to focus on that as well.
There's no hiding and there's no dispute, and I would
refer then to Instruction, Jury Instruction No. 49. Voluntary
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intoxication is not a defense to a criminal charge unless such
intoxication negates the existence of the mental state which is
an element of the offense.

Talk about the facts as applied to

this.
Julio quite frankly was really drunk.

We heard that

Jose Jimenez who testified, yeah, he appeared drunk to me. We
heard testimony from Teresa Martinez, as I indicated, he went
to a bar and he drank alcohol.

The Tequila bottle that was

found at Teresa's house was empty.

She felt that he was too

drunk to even probably safely operate a vehicle.

Trying to

prevent him from drinking and driving, she allowed him to stay
over.
I also want to talk about the kitchen knife.

We've

heard from Teresa's testimony that earlier that night, I think
maybe around 2:00 o'clock or so, Julio came over and they got
into a discussion.

It got emotional for him.

Somehow he ended

up knowing where that knife is in the kitchen, took that knife
and stabbed himself.

That's Teresa's testimony.

You can take

it for what it's worth, but let's assume that that's in fact
what happened.

That knife is a dangerous weapon.

where it is. He has access to that.

He knows

If he wanted to kill her,

wanted to commit a criminal homicide, why not use that knife?
It has a blade.

It's sharper.

a sharp end, puncture wounds.

Cuts easier.

Scissors, it has

Knife, you can slash.

Let's talk about the scissor part, State's Exhibit
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No. 7, it's found on the couch, lying on the couch in plain
sight.

Once again, let's go talk about the mental intent,

criminal homicide.

I try to kill someone, did I have the

intent, was I coherent and I knew what I was doing and I
intended to kill, I would not leave that weapon behind.
there.

It's

Why would he -- if the goal was to kill her and then

take off, he leaves that weapon in plain sight.
testimony of Officer Libertine.

That was the

The picture is right there.

We also heard from Officer Cowan that when he
confronted Julio at the 7-Eleven, there were observations that
he noted.

Julio was pointing to his head and neck area, and he

was agitated, and quite frankly, he was not making sense.
again, goes towards the mental state.
after.

Once

It did not make sense

So then what is the intent, state of mind of Julio

Martinez?
I think the State will also mention Gabriel
Martinez's statements again.

I have no doubt that Gabriel

Martinez heard something from his dad, something with regards
to the stabbing.

There's no doubt about that.

young child, this happened over a year ago.

But then he's a

We can assume he

heard something, something that dad said about what was
happening, but what exactly was said, how accurate
word-for-word?

Because not to discredit this young child, but

this young child also indicated that after this was all over,
after this image finally stopped, he recalls seeing dad heading
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off and getting to the 7-Eleven parking lot.
And I think the State also indicated the intent to
commit this criminal homicide was when Julio Martinez went to
7-Eleven and only purchased two items, a pair of scissors and
some cigarettes. Now keeping in mind that 7-Eleven is not
exactly Walmart, they have a limited supply of what they can
sell, they can offer, obviously he wasn't going there to get
more beer or to get a slurpee, but, yes, he did purchase a pair
of scissors and some cigarettes.
We can speculate if in fact that's the law.
the law.

It's not

But we can speculate as indicated and, say, well

bought the scissors to use to try to kill Teresa. At the same
time you can say we can speculate, bought the scissors, the
cigarettes.

Some people have certain habits that they do as

far as smoking.

I'm not a smoker myself.

I'm not going to go

into details about maybe how the scissors relate to the
cigarettes, but we do know that certain people have certain
patterns when it comes to smoking cigarettes.
But the other thing that I notice when Mr. Ferbrache
was giving his closing remarks was Teresa having to probably
crawl to the door within the house and locking it. Also the
purpose why I think the State pointed out is so that, as
Mr. Ferbrache indicated, the Defendant didn't come back and
finish the job.

That is interesting.

I didn't think about

this last night, but I thought about it as I was hearing this.
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Once again, it goes to the intent of Julio Martinez.
Now if the intent is to kill her, why didn't we have
any testimony?

Why is there no evidence he did try to come

back and finish the job?

Why didn't we hear anything from

Gabriel or Teresa, yeah, let's point that out, the door was
locked, he came back, he was pounding on it and he tried to get
in and he gave up and left again. No, he did not.
There's also been talked about the act itself, the
injuries.

Are these injuries consistent with an attempted

criminal homicide?

Are they fatal or did they create and

resulted in substantial bodily injury?
Now as I indicated in reference to Count No. I,
there's a road map, Instruction No. 34, and it kind of guides
you.

One option would be the domestic violence, attempted

criminal homicide.

Another option is domestic violence,

aggravated assault, substantial bodily injury.

Third one is

domestic violence, aggravated assault. Using force or a
dangerous weapon.

And obviously no door (inaudible.)

Working once again from head to toe based on the
pictures and the testimony, the scratches, you can see from the
pictures and Teresa also referred to her head and use of word
scratches, yes, she did sustain injuries. Were they
substantial, these scratches?
injuries?

Were they substantial bodily

Were they life threatening?
Moving down, let's talk about the arm.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

riosinq Argument by MR.TAN

She had to

34

1

have surgery on the arm.

2

substantial bodily injury.

3
4

Let's talk about the leg.

Some pretty gruesome

pictures of the leg and the two wounds there, the two deep

5 J wounds.
6

I think that is definitely a

Definitely substantial boldly injury from the

scissors. No doubt about that. Once again, does it amount to

7 I an attempted homicide?
8
9
10

As Dr. Duffy indicated, there were no injuries to the
chest area where the heart would be, no injuries to the neck,
no injuries to the abdomen.

11

We also know from some of the testimony minor details

12

but nevertheless just to point it out, one of the officers

13

decided to put AirMed on standby.

14

threatening, everyone would have showed up, everyone would have

15

taken Teresa to the hospital.

16

helicopter was on standby, but she was transported by ambulance

17

to the hospital.

18

bodily injury (inaudible) or dangerous weapon or is it

19

attempted criminal homicide?

20

Now if it was serious, life

It was on standby, the

Once again, does that amount to substantial

I would like to just refer to some of Dr. Duffy's

21 I testimony.

This is the State's expert witness.

This is the

22

witness that the State called, not one that we found.

23

the doctor that treated Teresa at the emergency room, evaluated

24

her.

25

This is

He indicated that his ABC's are stable.
Physical exam, generally she was awake, alert,
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oriented, conversant.
HEENT appeared normal. Neck normal.

Lungs clear.

Heart sounds normal. Abdomen soft, which I asked is that a
good sign?

Yes.

Extremities, no.

His assessment, Dr. Duffy's assessment, seven wounds
all together.

I think he pointed out two on the left upper

knee area, one on the armpit there.

I think that was the

.5-centimeter one. And then it looks like three wounds on her
left hand.
Once again, the doctor noted the patient as awake,
alert, oriented and does not appear to have sustained serious
bodily injuries.
Going towards the testimony of Teresa Martinez as
you've heard and also when you -- not when you heard what she
said, but you saw how she said it.
love with Julio when this happened.
yelling.

She was screaming.

It was obvious she was in
She was crying.

She was

She's entitled to all of that.

It's not fun when you get stabbed.
At the same time we know that she was alert, she was
awake, she was conversant.

Point this out, it's not a good

thing, not a good thing for Julio, but point it out
nevertheless she talked to Gabe, instructed Gabe what to do to
get help.
She talked to officers afterwards to make sure that
the kids are okay.

She talked with Kami Sandoval, gave some

Closing Argument by MR.TAN
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1

instructions to Kami.

2

injuries, but these were not life threatening.

3

probably wouldn't be able to do this hours later.

4

Once again, she had serious bodily
Otherwise she

I want to go back then to my chart here.

I want to

5

focus now on domestic violence, aggravated assault, SBI,

6

substantial bodily injury.

7

(inaudible).

8

regards to that.

9

That is one the options

There's also a specific jury instruction in

Frankly, I don't think Option No. 2 meets and fits

10

the facts here.

11

That jury instruction does not mention anything about a

12

dangerous weapon.

13

does not have language about life is death, or substantial

14

bodily injury.

15

instruction right here, domestic violence, aggravated assault,

16

using unlawful force or a dangerous weapon.

17

through that.

18

We're missing some important information.

That jury instruction does not talk about or

So I want to talk about then this jury

I'm going to go

I believe this should be Instruction No. 36.

19

Actually it's not Instruction No. 36, it is the one before

20

that, Instruction No. 35. Before you can convict the

21

Defendant, Julio Martinez, of the crime of domestic violence

22 } attempted criminal -- okay.
23

Okay.

Let .me find the right one first.

Instruction No. 39, before you can convict the

24

Defendant, Julio Inez Martinez, of the crime of lesser included

25

offense of domestic violence, aggravated assault, using force

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
M P TZ\TVT
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Closing Arqument bv

or dangerous weapon, you must find from all the evidence the
following elements.

There are four.

I would invite you to apply the facts and the
testimony and the evidence on what you heard the last two days
to these elements.
, On or about May 5th, 2009, in Salt Lake County, all
that's been established.

There's no doubt about that.

Element No. 2, the Defendant intentionally or
knowingly or recklessly goes and talks about the mental state.
Notice if you will, the first option, domestic violence,
attempted criminal homicide, one element I mentioned intent, it
is intentionally.

You'll have the documents to consider.

Instruction No. 39 gives you an option to consider
the possibility of knowingly recklessly.

How drunk.was he?

Was he acting reckless?
Third element, which I think would be appropriate,
talks about a dangerous weapon.

That said Defendant did then

and there use a dangerous weapon, the scissors.

Or such other

means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury.

Gives you some options there.
Likely to produce death.

jugular.

Pretty serious.

Yes, he didn't go for the

But yes, if unattended, if Gabe

didn't step in and make the call, gave the right information,
the paramedics showed up, she could have bled to death.

Likely

to produce death from those wounds or serious bodily injury.
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1

That is what we have, serious bodily injury.

2

I want to then move to Instruction No. 36, with some

3

definitions.

4

violence.

5

weapon?

6

voluntary injury that causes serious permanent disfigurement.

7

Yeah, she'd have some scars.

8

a function of any bodily member or organ.

. 9

numb.

10

yeah.

11
12

What is an assault.

What is defined as domestic

What constitutes (inaudible) what is a dangerous

It's a very vast one.

Serious bodily injury means

Protracted loss or impairment of
Her fingers were

Or creates a substantial risk of death.

Unfortunately

I think instruction --or element No. 4,
co-habitation is also met on this jury instruction.

13

(Inaudible) assault, using unlawful force, dangerous

14

weapon, co-habit, I don't think there are any issues, although

15

some things did come up that the marriage was kind of on the

16

border so to speak.

Sometimes she would go, Teresa would go

17 J not talk to Julio for months, sometimes for a couple of days
18

but at the same time I think we can meet co-habitation because

19

she also testified that even though sometimes she also not

20

talking with him for months or even a couple of days, he was

21

still driving her car.

22

allowed him at the beginning to lay next to her in the same

23

bed.

24
25

When he came over, I think she even

So finally, members of the jury, I would ask on
behalf of Mr. Martinez, that although it might be hard try, to
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set aside emotions.

This was a -- not the more pleasant case

to hear, emotionally, tears. Try to set aside those emotions
if you can.

Try to follow the law, the jury instructions.

Because frankly, Julio let his emotions get the best of him.
And frankly, Julio did not follow the law.
I would ask that after deliberating you find Julio
Martinez guilty on Count I, as domestic violence, aggravated
assault using unlawful force or dangerous weapon, focus on
those four elements that we stated, and please apply those to
the facts and testimony.
THE COURT:

Thank you very much.

Mr. Ferbrache.

MR. FERBRACHE:

Thank you, your Honor,

CLOSING ARGUMENT
BY MR. FERBRACHE:
I promise to be brief.

I only want to address a few

things Mr. Tan indicated or spoke about.

Thank you.

Drinking, going to the bar, there's no evidence that
he was drunk.

You saw him on the 7-Eleven surveillance video,

he could walk.

He wasn't running into the door.

the door just fine.

He was driving around.

He could open

He drove to

Teresa's, he drove to 7-Eleven, he drove back.
Officer Lucas Johnson testified that he spoke just
fine to him.

Julio was able to understand him when he was

saying those things to her. He wasn't drunk (inaudible.)
Mr. Tan said that there's no evidence of him coming
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August 5, 2010
P R O C E E D I N G S
* *

THE COURT:

*

Good afternoon everyone.

Who do I have

on the phone?
MR. FERBRACHE:
MR. TAN:

Gregory Ferbrache for the State.

Patrick Tan for Mr. Martinez.

THE COURTi

All right.

I heard yesterday that, as

you know, I play --my clerk is Sam Goble who works at LDA, and
Sam had let slip that yesterday when we were playing squash
that Ms. Shreve was, not last night but the night before,
followed home and had to alert the authorities.

I don't know

if it's related or not, but because of the nature of the case
and the past allegations and with sentencing coming up, I
thought that that was an appropriate disclosure for the record.
MR. TAN:

I would have to agree with that as well,

Judge.
MR. FERBRACHE:
MR. TAN:

I'm sorry what?

I- would have to agree.

I think that does

become an issue.
THE COURT: Well, I don't know if it's an issue or
not an issue.

I leave that to whoever.

I just --it's an

appropriate disclosure for the record.
MR. FERBRACHE:
MR. TAN:

Did she report this incident?

She did call the Kaysville Police.
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1

MR. FERBRACHE: Well, you are just saying -- and as

2

Sandi indicated, if there is (inaudible) intimation it's a

3

criminal -- that needs to be criminally investigated so let's

4

look at it that way.

5

she have a case number?

6

I think she needs to report this.

Does

THE COURT: And I leave that entirely up to you.

7

This is simply -- you know, this is a communication I received

8

that may or may not relate to the case, but because of the

9

allegations that had previously been made, I think out of an

10

abundance of caution it's appropriate for me to place it on the

11

record that that's what I had been told.

12
13

MR. TAN:

I think that's appropriate.

Without

Ms. Shreve being here, I don't have all the details as to --

14

THE COURT:

I don't know anything other than that.

15

There were no questions.

16

it at that point.

I didn't ask.

I immediately stopped

Don't know who it was, what it's related,

17 J the outcome, anything like that, Mr. Tan.

Only that I was

18

informed that the night before it was alleged that somebody had

19

followed her and that she had alerted the authorities.

So --

20

MR. TAN:

Okay.

21

THE COURT: As I say related, unrelated I have no

22

idea, but you both know how I am about disclosures hopefully by

23

now.

24

MR. TAN: Right.

25

THE COURT: And always believe that that's, so.
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MR. FERBRACHE:

Patrick would you please have Charity

contact me immediately.
MR. TAN:

She is on vacation, and I don't think she's

going to be back until next week.
MR. FERBRACHE: Okay.
MR. TAN:

I'd rather not bother her while she's on

vacation if this is not urgent, that would be ray preference.
MR. FERBRACHE: Okay.
MR. TAN:

And so -- but I definitely will bring it to

her attention when she gets back in town next week -MR. FERBRACHE: Okay.
MR. TAN:

-- SO.

MR. FERBRACHE:

Okay.

And I'll talk to my office in

the meantime, see what they suggest as well.
THE COURT:

Sure. That makes sense.

MR. FERBRACHE:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Goodbye everybody.

(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.)
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